# The Science of Change: The Importance of Methodology in Leading Change in the Army

**A Monograph**

**by**

**Major Martine S. Kidd**

**United States Army**


**School of Advanced Military Studies**

**United States Army Command and General Staff College**

**Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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MAJ Martine S. Kidd

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Approved by:

_____ Monograph Director
James Martin, Ph.D.

_____ Director,
Kevin C.M. Benson, COL, AR School of Advanced Military Studies

_____ Director,
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D. Graduate Degree Programs

## Abstract

The Science of Change: The Importance of Methodology in Leading Change in the Army by Major Martine S. Kidd, United States Army, 58 pages.

This study investigates the science of change management and seeks to discover how well the Army handles the process of leading and managing change. Using John Kotter's eight step process for change management (CM) as a benchmark model, this monograph presents three case studies for analysis and comparison. Each case study is qualitatively measured against the 'ideal' presented in Kotter's CM model in his book *Leading Change*. The case studies include the Army's adoption of the black beret, the new Army Combat Uniform (ACU), and the introduction of Lean Six Sigma (LSS) processes at Letterkenny Army Depot.

Included is a definition of CM and critical review of what CM is in comparison to process management. These two practices are carefully delineated in order to depict the broad applicability of CM tools, specifically Kotter's model, in comparison to targeted process management tools like LSS.

While the case studies presented are not an exhaustive representation of the Army's efforts to effect change, the observations and analysis provided indicate that the Army enjoys mixed results at leading change. The evidence also suggests that applying the science and methodology of CM is a critical enabler and catalyst for positive results. Additionally, the monograph points to a systemic lack of Professional Military Education (PME) on the topic of CM and recommends the introduction of a tiered system of educating our leaders beginning at the Sergeants Major Academy, the Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC), and continuing at each venue through the Brigadier General's Training Course (BGTC).

For Justin
My love and inspiration ~ Forever!

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*All human institutions must inevitably deal with the tension between continuity and change, between preserving that which has met the needs of the past and adapting to the challenge of change in a confusing present and uncertain future. This is true in politics, law, economics, and the arts; but this tension is particularly evident in military institutions in which tradition and the need for disciplined acceptance of authority in the chaos of battle vie with the equally strong pressures to meet the demands of new realities of social transformation and…new means of waging war.*[1]

*-Harold R. Winton, The Challenge of Change*

# INTRODUCTION

## Background

As the United States looks to the future it is impossible to know what lies ahead, what enemies or adversaries we will face or what challenges it holds. The Army's future is inextricably linked to the nation's future and the institution is often charged with helping to shape and defend that future. Yet, anticipating future requirements and demands on the Army is hardly a perfect science. Looking to the Army's past is revealing, however, and does offer one significant reality: change is a permanent part of the landscape.

There are volumes of material written about how armies have evolved across the ages. Often, these changes or evolutions and revolutions in military affairs occur in a peacetime environment where methodical processes are initiated and extensive time and effort are spent attempting to learn the lessons from the latest conflict(s), in order to devise ways to eclipse these problems. Other times, armies must adapt and change under fire. The focus is always on making the business of war simpler, reducing the friction, fog, and chaos of war while increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of the forces. In either case, a multitude of materiel, organizational, doctrinal, and personnel solutions are developed and codified in order to achieve one thing -- victory.

[1]Harold R.Winton and David R. Mets, *The Challenge of Change: Military Institutions and New Realities, 1918-1941*. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 2000), p. xi.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the military took significant strides towards improving its operations by adopting and institutionalizing an entirely new lexicon – the language of big business. As part of this effort, the Army made considerable headway attempting to assimilate the "best practices" from corporate America into the military and governmental management milieu. At the center of much of this effort were endeavors to reduce the costs associated with operating, equipping, supplying and maintaining forces. Every dollar was increasingly scrutinized. Terms and phrases such as Total Quality Management (TQM), inventory carrying costs, just-in-time logistics, and customer support became a regular part of the daily dialogue even at the lowest levels in the Army.

As part of the military's focus to advance these efforts and improve efficiency and effectiveness across a larger spectrum of business management practices, the Department of Defense (DoD), as well as the Department of the Army (DA), cultivated an explosive growth in the use of and reference to business models, such as Lean Six Sigma (LSS). In fact, LSS has officially become an Army mandate as recently as April 2006.[2] While LSS unquestionably has strategic applicability for the Army, especially with regard to acquisition, materiel fielding, and recapitalization processes, it is a model heavily laden in the metrics and language of program, production, and financial management. However, LSS is not a model easily templated to a wider range of Army activities--especially at the operational and tactical levels.

## Significance

The introduction of change, especially sweeping change, into any organization fundamentally alters that body. Therefore, viewing change holistically and systemically is crucial. This is particularly important when dealing within the bureaucracy that exists in any governmental entity, as well as the military. Bureaucracies are laden with interdependencies, some of which are

[2]Department of the Army, Lean Six Sigma Base Order (Washington, D.C., April 2006); accessed 30 October 2006, available at www.army.mil/armybtkc/docs/LSS%20Deployment%20Order.pdf.

cultural, administrative, organizational, and hierarchical in nature. It can be very dangerous to telescope one's view down to only a small portion of, or node within, the organization and assume that you can make isolated changes without having a potentially negative impact elsewhere in the system. The potential to sub-optimize the processes and functions of other parts of the organization is extremely high. In a recent interview with Lieutenant General (LTG) C.V. Christianson, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (J4) on the Joint Staff, he strongly emphasized the importance of understanding change from a systemic perspective. LTG Christianson rhetorically asked, "If we know we have to change, how do we know we're going to the right place?" He suggested the answer is a value proposition and the solution must be consistent with your organization's reason for being.[3]

Perhaps at no time previously in our history has the Army undergone such sweeping change, while simultaneously enduring the pressure of extensive combat and stability operations worldwide. The multitude of Army transformation initiatives, to include modularity, rebasing, and concurrent Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) activities, has had a tremendous impact throughout the institution. The scope of these changes is unprecedented and the potential for "organizational whiplash" is extremely high. Therefore, the mandate for understanding the demanding nature of leading and managing change is quite clear. With the limited exception of tools like LSS, which targets strategic level and industrial operations, it seems as if a construct specifically emplaced to fully examine and understand the process of leading and managing change in the Army has largely been left to the initiative and individual ability of the leaders implementing change.

There are some exceptions which do depict the DoD efforts to provide at least some construct to support the concept of leading change. Only recently has the DoD established the Business Transformation Agency to act as the lead in coordinating what has been termed "business

[3]LTG C.V. Christianson, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 30 January 2007.

transformation efforts."[4] Additionally, the Army has responded with its own nested initiatives, to include the Business Transformation Knowledge Management Center website. This website has a link to enablers for business transformation, which includes a Change Management Knowledge Center.[5] While these are noteworthy steps towards the improvement and inculcation of streamlining and improving the DoD and DA's stewardship of the financial and other resources allocated to the departments, the focus remains primarily on production operations and process-oriented ventures related to the drive for dollar-cost savings. That Change Management (CM) is referenced as a subordinate enabler to business transformation tools like LSS also provides insight as to the relative emphasis CM is afforded, from a holistic perspective. Further, CM models, tools and constructs for leading and managing change at the tactical and operational levels are also minimal, but notably, the John Kotter model, from his book *Leading Change*, is acknowledged by the Departments of Defense and Army, and referred to on the Army's CM Knowledge Center website--as are a few other CM models and "industry best practices." There is also a relatively obscure reference to his model in the recently revised Field Manual (FM) 6-22, *Army Leadership*, (formerly FM 100-22). This newly revised manual incorporates a very brief discussion on leading change in its chapter on strategic leadership, which replicates only the outline of Kotter's model. As for formal instruction for uniformed personnel in DoD, the only courses currently offered include a course introduced in June of 2005, at the Army's Logistics Management College at Fort Lee, Virginia, entitled, "Logistics Transformation and Change Management", which is designed for officers in the grade of Major to Colonel. Also available is an elective at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) for students attending

[4]Department of Defense, Business Transformation FAQs, (Washington, D.C., 2006), accessed 2 November 2006, available at http://www.dod.mil/dbt/faq_bta.html

[5]Department of the Army, Army Business Transformation Knowledge Center, (Washington D.C., 2006) accessed 2 November 2006., available at http://www.army.mil/ArmyBTKC/bt/index.htm.

Intermediate Level Education (ILE), called "Leadership: A Force for Change."[6] This course was launched in 1999, but only cursorily delved into the science of CM. Starting in the spring of 2006, CGSC now devotes the entire elective focused solely on this topic.

The inference made by the subordination of CM deserves additional reflection. Should CM be viewed as the more holistic and inclusive approach? Is CM the higher order model, transcending the various "business transformation" models? It is asserted here that CM is the highest order and that all other models, to include tools such as LSS, should be selected and applied as appropriate only after considering the models and processes of CM as the more pervasive, umbrella concept.

The Army must bridge the current educational and knowledge gap with deliberate instruction to our leaders that will afford a fundamental understanding of CM and the models available to assist them in leading change. With purposeful instruction, offered at planned intervals throughout a leader's military service, the Army will reap the benefits of imbuing these vital skills and better position leaders at all levels to deal with change in a proactive and constructive manner. These leaders will then be fully equipped to actively support a wide spectrum of potential change initiatives. Quite simply, this education is critical to implementing and enabling lasting and effective change.

[6]Command and General Staff College, Elective Course Guide, (Fort Leavenworth, KS., Department of the Army 2005), pg. 99

# CHAPTER ONE
# DEFINING CHANGE MANAGEMENT (CM)

The Army is an action-oriented, problem solving institution. Leaders at all levels are taught to identify problems, develop solutions, implement them, then monitor and assess progress. This simple loop (problem identification, solution development, implementation and assessment) occurs *daily* and at all levels in the Army.

In most cases, Soldiers and leaders are amazingly good at identifying problems and running through the rest of the loop – especially when the issue lacks complexity, the final decision maker is immediately available, or the solution is of a limited scope, bearing minimal impact beyond the bounds of a small unit. Conversely, when the complexity of change increases, the decision maker is several levels removed or when the scope and impact of the change expands, our action-oriented, problem-solving leaders begin to experience friction and resistance. What Army leaders need is a better understanding and familiarization with CM process and models so they are better equipped to lead and manage change.

## What is Change Management?

For the purposes of this study, Change Management is defined as:

> …the process of developing a planned approach to change in an organization. Typically, the objective is to maximize the collective benefits for all people involved in the change and minimize the risk of failure of implementing the change. The discipline of change management deals primarily with the human aspect of change and is therefore related to pure and industrial psychology.[7]

While no DoD definition for CM was found, the Army's Program Executive Office (PEO) for Enterprise Information Systems offers a useful technical definition: "… [CM is a] process of controlling changes to the infrastructure or any aspect of services, in a controlled manner,

[7]Defined on http://www.reference.com

enabling approved changes with minimum disruption."[8] The critical similarities in both these definitions include the maximization of benefits and minimization of disruption. Also, the first definition makes a subtle and important observation, specifically referencing the human element in managing change. However, it should be underscored that neither of these definitions narrowly targets a specific change effort or type of organization.

This paper suggests the need for a more logical approach and investigation of the CM process, before jumping into the middle of directing change. Unfortunately, quite often when change is being considered, the dialogue begins by identifying only a portion of the problem or symptoms, perhaps outlining a vision or end-state or by over-simplifying the requirements and describing *one* or *two* obvious actions that must occur in order to effect the change.

This study will now propose a more systematic exploration of what change management encompasses. For clarity of analysis and because the research conducted has revealed one model in particular to be an excellent mental spring-board for change management, this study will focus on the eight-step process of creating major change authored by John P. Kotter in his book, *Leading Change.*

## The Kotter model: An eight-step process for creating major change

Originally outlined in *Harvard Business Review* in 1995, the Kotter CM process is encapsulated in an article entitled "Why Transformation Efforts Fail". This article seeded the expanded discussion provided in *Leading Change*, written a year later in 1996. The Kotter model is summarized in the table below.

[8]Department of the Army, Enterprise Solutions Competency Center, (Washington, D.C., accessed 7 November 2006), available at: http://www.army.mil/escc/rc/terms.htm.

John Kotter Change Management (CM) Process

| Steps | Transformation Suggestions |
|---|---|
| **1. Establish a sense of urgency** | • Examine market and competitive realities<br>• Identify and discuss crisis, potential crisis, or major opportunities<br>• Provide evidence from outside the organization that change is necessary |
| **2. Build the guiding team (the guiding coalition)** | • Assemble a group with enough power to lead the change effort.<br>• Attract key change leaders by showing enthusiasm and commitment<br>• Get the group to work together as a team |
| **3. Develop a vision & strategy** | • Develop a vision to help direct the change effort<br>• Develop strategies for achieving that vision |
| **4. Communicate the change vision** | • Use every vehicle possible to communicate the new vision and strategies<br>• Keep communication simple and heartfelt<br>• Have the guiding coalition role model the behavior expected of employees |
| **5. Empowering Broad-Based Action** | • Get rid of obstacles to the change.<br>• Change systems or structures that undermine the vision.<br>• Encourage risk-taking and non-traditional ideas, activities, and actions. |
| **6. Create short term wins** | • Plan for visible performance improvements, or "wins".<br>• Create those wins.<br>• Visibly recognize and reward people who made the wins possible. |
| **7. Consolidate gains and produce more change** | • Use increased credibility to change all systems, structures, and policies that don't fit together and don't fit the transformation vision<br>• •Hire, promote and develop people who can implement the change vision<br>• Reinvigorate the process with new projects, themes and change agents. |
| **8. Make Change Stick** | • Articulate the connections between the new behaviors and organizational success.<br>• Develop the means to ensure leadership development and succession. |

Source: Table adapted from John P. Kotter, *Leading Change,* (1996), p. 21 and "Why Transformation Efforts Fail", *Harvard Business Review*, (1995)

**Figure 1 The eight step Kotter CM process**

Most leaders will quickly identify several steps that contain potential obstacles in their efforts to lead change in the Army, even after only a cursory review of the model. So, while the table conveniently abbreviates the steps of Kotter's CM process, there are crucial points within each step that are fully developed in the text of *Leading Change* and deserve additional attention here. The elements of the eight steps will be highlighted to provide additional emphasis and enable a better understanding of the analysis and efficacy of the change initiatives used later in this

monograph and represented in the case studies. Therefore, drawing attention to the details is necessary before proceeding.

## Kotter CM process in depth

Kotter emphasizes that the vast majority of all change efforts will go thru the eight steps in sequence, although perhaps operating in multiple phases at once. He also strongly discourages skipping any step or advancing too far down the process without having solidified progress made possible in the earlier phases. Until now, this dialogue has made no distinction between leading and managing change. As will be demonstrated, in step number two of his model, Kotter does distinguish between the two, stressing the predominant role of *leading* change over merely the management of change. While Kotter does not dismiss the manager, he judges the leaders' role as central to making the dynamic CM process work, with successful change resulting from as much as 70 to 90 percent leadership actions and 10 to 30 percent management activities.[9]

> Management is a set of processes that can keep a complicated system of people and technology running smoothly. The most important aspects…include planning, budgeting, organizing, staffing, controlling and problem solving.
>
> Leadership is a set of processes that creates organizations in the first place or adapts them to significantly changing circumstances. Leadership defines what the future should look like, aligns people with that vision, and inspires them to make it happen despite the obstacles.[10]

## Step number one – Establish a sense of urgency

> "*Change may be good for others or even for the system as a whole, but unless it is specifically good for us, we will resist it.*"[11]

Establishing urgency may seem like an intuitively simple task. The person in charge may think, 'I'll just announce to the organization that this new task or change is important to our

[9]John P Kotter. *Leading Change.* (Boston, Mass: Harvard Business School Press, 1996) pgs. 23, 25,26.

[10]Ibid, pg. 25.

[11]James O'Toole. *Leading Change : The Argument for Values-Based Leadership.* (New York; San Francisco: Ballentine Books; Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1996), pg. 161.

future and because they work for me, they'll get on board.' Kotter quickly debunks this myth and points to nine sources of complacency. James O'Toole, in his book (also titled *Leading Change*) provides an even more extensive list of 33 hypotheses why people resist change.[12] The point is, that simply being in a position of authority may influence some subordinates to follow quite readily whenever change initiatives are introduced, yet the reality is that most people need to be personally convinced and inspired to do the hard work that is necessary. They must be motivated to believe that their efforts are going to be worth it in the end and that they will simultaneously preserve their position in the organization, at least in some fashion. Moving through this step without placing proper emphasis on it will have a ripple effect that may make recovery difficult to impossible at later stages in the project.

## Step number two – Build the guiding team (the guiding coalition)

> "*Major transformations are often associated with one highly visible individual… [However] No one individual, even a monarch-like CEO is ever able to… [do it all*]…"[13]

In large organizations like the Army, teamwork is essential. Kotter validates this idea and identifies four vital characteristics that the team must possess. They include: position power, expertise, credibility and leadership. Position power involves choosing the right people across the stratum of the organization for the team, and avoiding including only the 'usual suspects' such as departmental heads. Instead, other key players such as first-line supervisors and those able to exert influence and provide an understanding of the on-going change process for other employees should be considered for inclusion in the guiding coalition. Leadership is strongly emphasized in the composition of Kotter's guiding coalition. Recall that in this step Kotter distinguishes between leaders and managers and is careful to underscore the important roles that both must play

[12]Ibid.

[13]John P. Kotter, *Leading Change*, (Boston, Mass: Harvard Business School Press, 1996), pgs 51 and 52.

on the guiding team. He views managers as best able to control the process while leaders are responsible to *drive* the process.

Another important component of this step is to foster trust and teamwork within the guiding coalition. The author provides suggestions on how best to accomplish this challenging task, to include organizing off-site retreats that will enable the team to bond with one another and providing unifying goals and objectives.

As with step number one, building the team may seem simple or intuitive. Normally, a default condition in the military is to select persons in key duty positions, such as unit commanders, their senior non-commissioned officers, functionally-related staff officers, or an ad-hoc assignment of project officers. However, as outlined in Kotter's model, the thoughtful construction of this team should include a cross-section of members from the organization that will ensure maximum ability to reach the intended audiences, that are equipped with enough expertise and leadership to effectively shepherd the process, and will ultimately assist in reducing resistance.[14]

## Step number three – Develop a vision and strategy

> "*I am sometimes amazed at how many people try to transform organizations using methods that look like…authoritarian decree and micromanagement.*"[15]

Providing a vision for change initiatives is essential. A well-conceived vision will vividly illustrate for a wide audience where the organization is headed and why. As well as providing a roadmap for the future, Kotter expertly summarizes two additional reasons why vision is so important. First, it provides motivation for people to become active participants; nesting with the earlier step of establishing a sense of urgency. Second, vision enables unity of effort, which is especially important in large organizations and/or when managing complex tasks.

[14]Ibid, pg 57, 63 and 65.
[15]Ibid, pg 68

According to Kotter, other traits that an effective vision must possess include being imaginable, desirable, feasible, focused yet flexible, and communicable.[16] A vision that contains these traits is more likely to inspire employees, create momentum for change initiatives and assist in diminishing resistance along the way.

Tackling this domain is typically not problematic for the military, as vision statements, statements of intent (commander's intent), and mission statements are routinely used to provide a framework and context for teams, groups and units undertaking any mission.

## Step number four – Communicate the change vision

*"Communication is the backbone of leadership."*[17]

The good news is that the Army fully embraces the importance of publishing vision statements and usually works very hard to communicate vision. However, there is a difference between communicating and communicating *well*. Kotter lists seven key elements to effective communication: Simplicity, use of metaphors, use of multiple venues and forums, repetition, leading by example, explaining seeming inconsistencies and two-way communication[18].

Simplicity and clarity are essential. If the most junior members and largest population segment of your organization cannot easily explain your vision, or your roadmap, then your message will not reach them or provide impetus for them to get involved in a constructive manner.

Because we are inundated – practically overwhelmed – with information today, the use of multiple outlets to communicate a change vision, in conjunction with repetition of the message, is absolutely necessary in order to reach the intended audience. Without doing so, your change vision and best efforts to get people on board will be lost in a sea of other data and drowned out.

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[16]Ibid, pg 68, 69, 72.

[17]Harvard Business School Press, *Getting People on Board*, "Effective Leadership Communications", Boston Mass:, Harvard Business School Press, 2005) pg. 107.

[18]John P. Kotter, *Leading Change*, (Boston, Mass: Harvard Business School Press, 1996), pg. 90.

This is a step where the leaders' role is imperative. The personal involvement by leaders in transmitting and reinforcing the vision, themes and messages involved in a change initiative reinforces to the organization the amount of emphasis placed on the project. The larger an organization, the more difficult this task becomes even for key leaders.

Handling seeming inconsistencies between the change vision and actual happenings within the organization is vital.[19] Some leaders may not be aware of these conflicts. Others may be fully informed, but subsequently judge the problem to be merely an *appearance* of divergence and take no action to redress the issue. In either case, if the situation is not quickly and visibly attended to, those employees (or Soldiers) who have observed the deviation will believe that the leadership is insincere, and perhaps lacks the integrity to implement change in accordance with the espoused edicts. Heartfelt communications is one of Kotter's key elements in conveying vision. As with any decree made by leaders, there is a sea of expert listeners and observers in every unit that will know if you are saying one thing, but doing another. If you find your message lacks sincerity, or if subordinate leaders fail to affirm the vision by modeling undesired behavior, it may be necessary to reexamine the vision or make immediate corrections regarding the conduct of the leaders involved, to include potential elimination or reassignment.[20]

After reviewing Kotter's description of communicating vision, one quickly recognizes that there is more to effective communication than making a one-time announcement and posting a vision statement on the unit's website or on orderly room bulletin boards. So, while step four seems instinctive, it includes multiple trap-doors in execution. The challenges associated with step five, on the other hand, are particularly complex and demand the concentrated energy of unit leaders, as well.

[19]Ibid, pg. 97.
[20]Ibid, pgs 97 and 98.

## Step number five -- Empowering broad-based action

*"We have met the enemy, and he is us."*[21]
*Walt Kelly, 1970*

In many cases, step five will present significant difficulties for the Army as an organization. Here, Kotter underscores the reality that even when all the preceding steps have occurred successfully, leaders must anticipate and tackle the inertia created by the organizational structures, administrative systems, underdeveloped personnel skill sets and resistant mid-level supervisors inherent in any organization.[22]

Paralleling the potential barriers outlined by Kotter, and adapting them to the Army paradigm, a partial list of obstacles may include the following: a performance and appraisal system that fails to encourage innovation and incentivize soldiers with an associated risk and reward compensation program; a bureaucratic, hierarchical administrative process that stymies rapid and systemic improvement of even routine activities; and mid-grade supervisors who are afraid of being outmoded or deemed ineffective when faced with a myriad of demanding new tasks. These supervisors grip tightly to ingrained habits that have proven successful in the past. Habits, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) are part of the military culture. This leads us to another unwitting obstacle that the military must confront -- the challenge of balancing tradition and a sense of reverence for our organizational histories with the demands and uncertainties of the future battlefield environment. Tightly interwoven in this balancing act between reverence for our military history and the pressure for future improved performance, we catch a glimpse of cultural risk aversion. On one hand, a certain amount of risk aversion preserves the Army and grounds it in those techniques that have saved lives and delivered battlefield victories. On the other hand, risk aversion can, and has anchored entire organizations in a paradoxical dilemma, strangling the life out of the very future it is attempting to preserve.

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[21] Quote is attributed to Walt Kelly, the creator of a long-running daily comic strip, "Pogo". accessed 20 November 06., available at www.igopogo.com.

[22] John P. Kotter. *Leading Change*, (Boston, Mass: Harvard Business School Press, 1996) pg 102.

Briefly returning to the human element mentioned earlier when defining CM, Harold Sirkin, Perry Keenan and Alan Jackson in their article, "The Hard Side of Change Management," investigated 225 companies and the outcomes of their change projects. While they focused on a term coined the "hard factors" which impact the outcomes of change projects, they also conceded the following: .

> …it isn't easy to change attitudes or relationships; they're deeply ingrained in organizations and people. And although changes in, say, culture or motivation levels can be indirectly gauged through surveys and interviews, it's tough to get reliable data on [them]… [23]

Clearly, finding ways to overcome the peculiar challenges presented in step number five requires more than embracing a slogan of 'empowerment'. It demands the laser-like attention of senior leaders and the enthusiastic participation and cooperation of mid-grade and junior leaders, alike.

## Step number six – Create short term wins

> "*The job of management is to win in the short term while making sure you're in an even stronger position to win in the future.*" [24]

Many change initiatives involve long-term goals that require patience and an understanding of how long it will take before the organization has arrived at its destination. For instance, consider the long-term efforts required to enact many transformation initiatives. With these sorts of projects, keeping your guiding coalition, as well as the rest of your organization, unified behind the effort requires an interim pat-on-the-back or two. This is where short-term wins are especially effective. A short-term win could be as simple as achieving a stated milestone and then visibly publicizing that success.

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[23]Harold Sirkin, Perry Keenan, and Alan Jackson, "The Hard Side of Change Management." (Boston, Mass. Harvard Business Review 83, no. 10, Oct 2005), pg 110.

[24]John P. Kotter, *Leading Change* (Boston, Mass: Harvard Business School Press, 1996), pg. 125

*Leading Change* describes the importance of short-term wins and what they do within the process of CM. In addition to building the credibility for the guiding coalition and all those involved, it assists in building their confidence, as well as the organization's confidence that the change process is working. Kotter lists six things that these wins produce. They provide evidence that the sacrifices are worth it; they reward change agents for their hard work; they help fine tune the vision and strategies by providing quantifiable data for the guiding team to review; they chip away at the cynics and others who may be resisting; they keep the bosses committed by showing progress; and they build momentum for the process itself which enables fence-sitters to get on board. Kotter is careful to explain that while planning to achieve these interim successes also increases pressure, that pressure is another way to help keep up the sense of urgency and motivation to excel within the guiding coalition.[25]

Again, as with the provision of vision statements, planning for and working towards the achievement of milestones, or interim goals, is a familiar process in the Army. However, the Army is not normally as careful to follow through with the highly visible public recognition of these achievements. Typically, the Army reserves these sorts of recognition events when the final objectives have been met. There are many reasons for this. One reason may be a tendency to downplay the expectations for future results in order to avoid any potential embarrassment at latter stages. Another reason, especially in today's environment, is the operational tempo in which units are conducting business. It is quite probable that stopping to recognize intermediate goals is viewed as a distraction from the existing and considerable workload they are faced with already. Unquestionably, the value of short-term wins is a significant facet of this step, but they are not an everlasting panacea either. Much continued work is necessary as outlined in steps seven and eight of Kotter's CM process.

[25]Ibid, pgs 123 and 127.

## Step number seven – Consolidate gains and produce more change

> "*Whenever you let up before the job is done, critical momentum can be lost and regression may follow. Until changed practices attain a new equilibrium and have been driven into the culture, they can be very fragile.*[26]

Let us assume we have tracked an organization's change efforts and found that they have generated tremendous progress using Kotter's CM model. A lot of hard work has been done and has resulted in significant improvements across the institution. As one might expect, the crucible of major transformation has taken a toll on the employees and the team is ready to rest on their laurels for a while. Sounds reasonable, does it not? It is entirely reasonable, which is why Kotter provides some guidance as a backstop. First, he points out that forward momentum subsides primarily for two reasons. One is increased interdependence and the second is culture. Organizational culture will be investigated in step eight. For now, the focus will remain on the problem of interdependence.

For most organizations, the whole really is greater than the sum of its parts. While this implies that some interdependence exists in most companies, it also suggests the component parts working in combination with one another can create a synergistic effect. As alluded to earlier, the difficulty of interjecting into any system is managing the effects across the breadth of the system as well as the usual resistance to change. The introduction of new roles or activities associated with change is foreign to the system and a common reaction is to resist in order to preserve the system. Resistance is a normal reaction. Again, Kotter provides some direction.

Before beginning, the leadership must be prepared to be patient. Guiding significant change is a long-term event and demands patience from leaders as they seek signs of progress. From his examination of a wide variety of companies and their transformations, Kotter has discovered five things that are routinely present in companies which have been successful in their change efforts. First, reduce the unnecessary interdependencies. For example, are there routine administrative

[26] Ibid, pg 133.

processes that are now antiquated because of new technology and whose continuing existence retards daily activities in your organization? This is an especially important consideration in larger organizations like the Army, who typically require complex actions to be "staffed", or reviewed, horizontally and vertically across multiple headquarters. Next, consider the combination of these potentially useless interdependencies and their impact on the overall number of changes that may be required. After doing this, Kotter suggests that you will often discover there are more changes needed, not fewer, in order to achieve a holistic approach to changing the status quo. Third, bring more people into the project(s) as you proceed. This achieves the effect of getting more help with your project(s), and allows more people to become a part of and attached to the process. Fourth, do not forget the project managers. They are junior leaders whose contribution will enable change throughout the depth and breadth of the institution. Finally, as stated, the most senior leaders must maintain their commitment and keep up the sense of urgency. Kotter also revisits the importance of key leaders, and their longevity in key positions. He reinforces the notion that change takes time and sufficient leadership to see it through to completion[27]. Clearly, this presents an enormous challenge for the Army as key leaders rotate frequently through a myriad of developmental positions.

An organization which successfully pushes through the difficulty presented in step number seven is better poised to succeed and transition to step number eight.

## Step number eight – Make change stick

*"There is nothing permanent, except change."*[28]
*-Hercaclitus*

There is an old adage in the Army – a unit performs well only those tasks that the commander inspects. In step number eight, Kotter corroborates this theme with an analogy, saying that

[27]John P. Kotter, *Leading Change* (Boston, Mass: Harvard Business School Press, 1996) pgs, 133, 138, 139, 143 and 144.

[28]Quote available at www.heartquotes.net/change.html. accessed on 13 February 2007.

"shallow roots require constant watering."[29] For example, consider the rapidly changing technological systems associated with the multitude of current transformation initiatives and the problem compounds. In these circumstances, making change stick becomes exponentially more difficult. How can the commander keep up?

As previously suggested, Army leaders are faced with the challenge of developing, implementing and anchoring change in as few as one or two years – the duration of some assignments. Martinus Nijhoff draws a similar comparison to the challenges faced by elected officials who attempt to implement change. In a volume published by the Hague in 1976, entitled *The Management of Change in Government*, Nijhoff illuminates the following point: When reading the excerpt, the original term "bureaucratic office holders" has been replaced with [soldiers] or [junior leaders], and the term "elected official" or "political actor" has been replaced with [commander(s)].

> …the time factor is usually of less importance to [soldiers] than it is to [junior leaders]. On the one hand, the [junior leaders] may feel less under pressure to reorganize within a particular period of time if [commanders] urge quick reforms for political purposes, unless the [soldiers and junior leaders] think they are likely to benefit from this reform.[30]

Related to this issue and introduced in the previous step, Kotter delves into the importance of *culture.* He enables his reader to gain an appreciation for the relationship between behavioral norms and value systems and how these can negatively impact change initiatives.

In a poignant example to illustrate the importance of culture, Kotter reaches back to step number four (communicate the vision) and the use of metaphors, telling a tremendously powerful story of how one Chief Executive Officer (CEO) deftly managed to encourage the new roots of change in his organization to grow. This CEO crafted a speech that respectfully paid homage to the company's old way of doing business. His public recognition of how successful the old processes had been in the past enabled his employees to embrace the power and importance of

[29]Ibid. pg, 147.
[30]Martinus Nijhoff, *The Management of Change in Government.* (The Hague, 1976) pg. 39.

what the old processes had meant to the company. Simultaneously, he encouraged them to embrace the newly established system. In his remarks, the CEO skillfully depicted the new system as possessing the same potential to grow and nurture their company -- just as the old processes once had. He also carefully tied the new procedures to the demands of the competitive corporate environment in which they were operating.[31] In this example, the CEO took stock of the culture and long-held values within his organization. His sincere, heartfelt appeal to the employees recognized the past and combined his hopeful depiction for the future. His is a tremendous example of successfully bridging a potential cultural gap with keen awareness and overt leadership.

As the detailed discussion of the Kotter model ends, this paper begins a comparison between a model for process management (LSS, specifically) and CM. It is important to draw the distinction between the related, but separate domain of production operations or process management (e.g., materiel acquisition, production control) and the specific tools necessary for those tasks, versus the broader and more generalized models for managing and leading change across a wide spectrum of change initiatives.

[31]John P. Kotter. *Leading Change*, (Boston, Mass.: Harvard Business School Press, 1996) pg, 152.

# CHAPTER TWO
# PROCESS MANAGEMENT VS. CHANGE MANAGEMENT

Process management is defined as "the ensemble of activities of planning and monitoring the performance of a process, especially in the sense of business process, often confused with reengineering."[32] Another definition identifies it as; "the execution and monitoring of repeatable business processes that have been defined by a set of formal procedures."[33]

A premier example of process management within the DoD is the DoD acquisition 5000 model. The Defense Acquisition System is described as: "…the management process by which the Department acquires weapon systems and automated information systems…the system is based on centralized policies and principles…"[34] Understandably, the DoD 5000 model is highly prescriptive in many aspects, with tremendous oversight and regulatory structures governing this process.

Lean Six Sigma is another form of process management with a tremendous degree of relevance for production oriented process. Michael George, the author of *Lean Six Sigma*, describes LSS as "a methodology that maximizes shareholder value by achieving the fastest rate of improvement in customer satisfaction, cost, quality, process speed and invested capital."[35] George goes on to underscore the applicability of LSS in a wide variety of transactional and manufacturing processes.

Importantly, it is essential to recognize that any form of process management aims at the continual collection and analysis of performance data, which is relevant for controlling variation or deviation from an established norm or desired standard within an existing process. Undoubtedly, applying a process management model, such as LSS, in an organization that may

[32]Defined on http://www.reference.com, accessed 26 November 2006.
[33]Defined on http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia, accessed 26 November 2006.
[34]Department of Defense, Defense Acquisition Guidbook, (Washington, D.C., Nov 2006), pg 4. accessed November 2006, available at http://akss.dau.mil/DAG/GuideBook/PDFs/GBNov2006.pdf
[35]Michael L. George, *Lean Six Sigma,* (New York City, New York, McGraw-Hill, 2002), pg. xii., xiii.

not have previously adhered to any such model, can effect enormous change and result in measurable increases in productivity and return on investment (ROI).

While LSS is a valuable tool supporting change in production oriented operations, to some the difference between process management and change management may not be obvious. Closer examination, however, reveals some important differences.

## Differences between process management and change management

Where process management differs significantly from change management is that process management tools like LSS enable improvement of an existing process with an emphasis on achieving efficiencies without necessarily changing the final output, or product, of the process. In process management, a company that makes and sells widgets, for example, is looking for ways to reduce costs, reduce delivery time and increase profitability while still producing widgets. The focus remains on how best to produce the same widgets.

Returning now to the definition of CM presented earlier in this analysis, change management is defined as; "…the process of developing a planned approach to change in an organization…."[36] Change management models, as opposed to process management models or tools, are not bound to improving or creating change in support of one particular process, system or type of organization. CM maintains flexible applicability across a wide array of potential change initiatives. CM, therefore, can be viewed as an important first step and overarching model to be used prior to the application of specific tools, like LSS, which function to support a particular process.

In considering the validity of this assertion, it is important to examine how well CM retains its flexibility and applicability for use across the strategic, operational and tactical levels. LSS remains highly useful at the strategic level, in support of appropriate activities. LSS seems to lose traction, however, at the operational and tactical levels where change activities vary widely and

[36]Defined on http://www.reference.com

may not be production-oriented. A visual depiction comparing the levels of applicability might look something like Figure 2, where LSS resembles an inverted pyramid with less and less direct applicability at descending levels in the Army. Once more, because CM models are not tied to any specific type of process or activity, they can be applied more evenly at all levels in the Army.




**Figure 2 Comparison of CM and process management**

LSS also deviates extensively from CM in the prescription and use of procedural tools of analysis. For example, LSS uses metrics involving pareto charts, pert charts, multi-vari statistical analysis, and supply chain analysis.[37] Clearly, these tools are not transferable to all change initiatives and infer the targeted nature of LSS. This is not to suggest that a broad CM model like Kotter's can not apply statistical analysis when measuring the effectiveness or progress of a change initiative that is being guided by his model. However, the Kotter model, and other CM models like it, provides the flexibility to guide the development and implementation of change projects that do not lend themselves to numerical measurement.

[37]Ibid, pg. 26.

## What do process management and change management have in common?

Thus far, an effort has been made to show how process management and change management are not synonymous. However, it is equally as valuable to recognize the similarities. Using LSS as a benchmark for process management, and comparing it to the Kotter CM model, the focus now shifts to how the two concepts nest.

In *Lean Six Sigma*, Michael George outlines his process improvement model with the acronym DMAIC, which prescribes five steps: Define, Measure, Analyze, Improve, and Control. Internal to each of the LSS steps are many analogous activities to those described in the Kotter model: LSS includes such things as project identification, generation of ideas/brainstorming, establishing a team charter, confirming team goals, and mistake proofing the process. These examples are analogous to steps 1 thru 3 in Kotter's model. Notably, LSS also dedicates ample time and effort describing the inculcation of the new procedures in the organizational psyche, much like Kotter in his eighth step, "make change stick".[38]

Investigating the similarities and differences further underscores a position stated earlier, that change management transcends business transformation tools such as LSS and is the higher order model. Change management is transitive to LSS, whereas LSS is not transitive to change management. CM models, in particular the Kotter model, are able to reinforce and support a variety of tools for process management, such as LSS. This concept will become more tangible as the review of case studies unfolds.

[38]Ibid, pg 171, 172, 226.

# CHAPTER THREE
# CASE STUDIES

## Case Study No 1 – The Black Beret

Out of tremendous respect for our Army's former Chief of Staff (CSA), General (GEN) Eric Shinseki (Retired) and the former Sergeant Major of the Army (SMA) Jack Tilley (Retired), it is important this case study begin with a disclaimer of what this investigation is and is not. It is not an attempt to cast aspersions on any of our Army's tremendously visionary leaders associated with this project. It is not an attempt to revisit the widely publicized and criticized aspects surrounding the beret's procurement. Nor is it in any way meant to marginalize those Soldiers and units within the Army who felt the beret decision was inappropriate. Conversely, this inquiry *is* meant to dispassionately and objectively focus on the *process* of managing change. In particular, the Army's change to the black beret was chosen because the scope of the change was very broad, involving nearly every unit and Soldier. At the same time, because of its relative simplicity (in comparison to more complex transformation programs) the case of the black beret is an easy-to-grasp example of how seemingly simple tasks can become complicated when dealing with the issue of change.

To gain an understanding of how this decision transpired, SMA (R) Jack L. Tilley graciously agreed to an interview to discuss the decision to implement the black beret. The synthesized transcript derived from the handwritten notes of the interview is available at Appendix C. While these notes were provided to SMA (R) Tilley to review and make corrections, to date he has not requested any changes. Still, any errors of context, intent or quotation are mine and not intended to be misattributed to the former SMA.

In October of 2000, when then Chief of Staff GEN Erik Shinseki announced the introduction of the new headgear for all Soldiers in the Army, he and SMA Tilley experienced an unanticipated wave of resistance. Using the John Kotter CM process as a model, this report will

focus on only those steps that provide evidence of deviation. Other steps of the model will be discussed, but abbreviated, as needed.

**Background**: SMA(R) Tilley recalled that as he assumed the duties of the SMA, the decision to procure the black beret for the wider Army had already been taken by GEN Shinseki. It was SMA(R) Tilley's understanding that the issue had actually been under consideration for several years and carried forward from several previous CSAs. When asked what he knew of the pre-decisional process, SMA(R) Tilley indicated that GEN Shinseki had held discussions with several other 3 and 4 star generals in the Army and asked them to review and consider the proposition with their CSMs. Apparently, after receiving no dissenting opinions from this very small, high-level circle of advisors, the decision was made to go ahead with the beret. Subsequent research suggests a more abrupt decision making process on behalf of the former CSA. In an article published in USA Today just days after the announcement, the Associated Press editorial labeled the decision a "surprise move" and indicated that GEN Shinseki had gotten the idea only a week earlier when he had attended a change of command ceremony for a special operations unit. In the article, Shinseki was quoted as saying,

> As I stood looking at those (Soldiers), I was reminded of the special significance that the beret has come to symbolize for the United States Army…It is time for the entire Army to accept the challenge of excellence that has so long been a hallmark of our special operations and airborne units.[39]

After the announcement, SMA Tilley was subsequently tasked to implement the change process. When asked if he had considered or used any CM models to help guide him, the SMA indicated that he had not.

While the Kotter model does not specifically address activities that precede step one or directly offer suggestions on how to lay the ground to prepare for change, this background seems to indicate, at least anecdotally, that condition setting for switching to the black beret was

[39]USA Today, "Coming Soon: Soldiers in Black Berets" accessed 11 January, 2007, available at: http://nucnews.net/nucnews/2000nn/0010nn/001017nn.htm#36.

somewhat inauspicious. In *Managing Change to Reduce Resistance,* one of the contributing authors to this Harvard Business School publication, Katherine Kane, discusses creating the right climate for change. Kane says that organizational leaders must signal their intentions, providing an indicator of the impending change.[40] Also in *Managing Change to Reduce Resistance,* John Kotter was interviewed. He was asked what one should listen for when the first indication of change is announced. His response is not surprising. Kotter says to listen for the "real vision higher up…where people get screwed up is they don't get the vision…"[41]

From this thorny start, it may not be surprising that GEN Shinseki immediately faced the challenge of overcoming tremendous resistance, some of which he insists was anticipated and some of which may have surprised him. The discussion that follows illuminates some of the fundamental stumbling blocks, measured against Kotter's model.

## Step number one – Establishing a sense of urgency

Step number one, establishing urgency, was entirely a function of GEN Shinseki's decision to implement the change Army wide on a strict timeline. There were eight months between the 17 October 2000 announcement and the implementation date of 14 June 2001. Contrary to the methods outlined in Kotter's model, there was little explanation offered, no attempt to enable an understanding of Shinkseki's vision, and he did not take action to motivate the troops and subordinate leaders to back the decision. It seemed a hasty proclamation that everyone was supposed to intuitively grasp and accept. In many public statements following the original announcement of the adoption of the black beret, GEN Shinseki stated that the beret, while largely symbolic, was meant to signify that the Army was in a state of transformation.[42] Yet

[40]Harvard Business School Press, *Managing Change to Reduce Resistance,* (Boston, Mass:, Harvard Business School Press 2005) pg 25.

[41]Ibid, pg 40.

[42]Department of Defense press briefing with Dep Sec Wolfawitz and Gen Shinseki., 16 Mar 2001., accessed 11 Jan 2007, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2001/t03162001_t316dsda.html

these statements were made as a reaction to the reality that the effort was already on the defensive and was playing catch-up.

## Step number two – Build the guiding team

SMA Tilley took up his responsibility with vigor. As he gathered his implementation team, it was largely comprised of members from the acquisition and logistics community. He recalled members included representatives from the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), Army Materiel Command (AMC), and other acquisition-related offices. Of note, the former SMA bluntly stated, "for the most part, officers were cut out of the process," making this a (Non-Commissioned Officer) NCO-centric event.[43]

Kotter's model would find the composition of this guiding coalition highly suspect. Ideally, the coalition itself would have formed and assisted in preparing the vision and presenting options and ideas prior to the implementation announcement, as well. As it stood, the team undoubtedly contained an important leader in the SMA, as well as the technical experts and managers from the acquisition and logistics community, but it seemingly lacked a viable cross-section of subordinate leaders from across the Army. Involving persons of influence to include senior and mid grade leaders and both commissioned and non-commissioned officers from a variety of units may have assisted in smoothing the transition and in transmitting the CSA's intent and message. Other important members of the guiding team could have been selected from the special operations community, in particular from the Ranger Regiment. The decision had a traumatic *emotional* impact on this small, but important population of Soldiers, because it required them to give up the distinctive headgear which they had had worn proudly for several decades. Rangers had to earn the right to wear the distinctive headgear through their rigorous training and indoctrination process, which also qualified them to hold a position as a member of the elite Ranger Regiment.

[43] SMA(R) Jack Tilley, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS., 30 November 2006.

SMA(R) Tilley made a tremendously insightful comment as he revealed a surprising source of resistance to the black beret decision. He said retirees were very upset about the beret. He believes this was because any changes to the Army, whether it be in uniforms or such things as changing the Army slogan (from "Be all that you can be" to "An Army of One") acutely affect retirees because these changes further remove the retired Soldier from his or her time in service and from the Army they remember. SMA(R) Tilley also remarked that the Army must devise a way to more effectively communicate with the retiree population.[44] This important segment of the Army's population has tremendous influence over a range of issues and is a vital part of the larger Army community. They can be an instrumental part of the Army team into the future as they continue to serve in other ways.

Had a guiding coalition that was more representative of key segments of the Army been assembled, perhaps the tidal wave of initial resistance could have been defused. While it is purely speculation to suggest this, and as indicated via our understanding of the Kotter model, it is recognized that even a properly balanced guiding coalition would not have eliminated all resistance.

## Steps number three and four – Develop a vision and strategy & Communicate the change vision

As SMA(R) Tilley remembered, there was no formal strategy or vision statement produced to guide the coalition or assist them in transmitting the CSA's intent to the wider Army or other interested audiences. A history of the beret was published, however, and printed in multiple mediums to include NCO Journal, the Army Times and Association of the United States Army (AUSA) Magazine. Aside from this attempt to provide historical context and explain the beret's tie to Army heraldry, whenever the SMA traveled, he consistently found himself answering questions surrounding the beret. He focused on explaining the decision to senior NCOs and

[44]Ibid.

imbuing an understanding of the proper standards for wear and appearance, especially when he traveled to NCO academies, such as the Sergeant's Major Academy (USASMA). Finally, numerous communications involved public statements made by both the former CSA and SMA, which were largely defensive or explanatory in nature.

Surprisingly, steps three and four seemed to lack the typical concentrated effort which is so commonly applied throughout the Army when embarking on a new venture. In fact, during the interview SMA(R) Tilley remarked that in view of a CM model like Kotter's, these steps were not executed as well or as vigorously as they could have been in order to facilitate the reduction of resistance.[45]

## Step number five – Empowering broad based action

In the context of step number five, there are numerous obstacles SMA Tilley and his team encountered in implementation, especially tied to the troublesome acquisition systems and the organizational structures inherent in that process. Bear in mind that this study remains focused on the more generalized concept of CM and will avoid discussing the acquisition process as a supporting function that is subordinate to the larger ideal of CM. However, many of SMA(R) Tilley's observations made during this portion of the interview will be revisited as we discuss the matter of leadership and Army culture in step number eight.

## Step six – Create short-term wins

While there appeared to be minimal opportunities to generate short-term wins, there was one area that was perhaps a missed opportunity. As described by SMA(R) Tilley, there was a point in the implementation process where a decision was required regarding the ornamental flash design for the beret. The Army's Institute of Heraldry ensured that the prototype design and colors were historically correct. Once available, SMA Tilley took the prototypes to the USASMA and other

[45]Ibid.

NCO academies to gather feedback. Two final designs were selected and presented for decision to the CSA and SMA, and the decision to adopt the one worn today was made.

As Kotter suggests, step number six is an opportunity to visibly recognize those members who have worked hard on the guiding team as well to create momentum for the change across an organization. While SMA Tilley did elicit feedback at this stage from an audience of senior NCOs, he may have had a chance to co-opt a much larger segment of the Army's population had he selected a wider audience to gain suggestions on the design, before prototype production, and subsequently seek feedback on the eventual prototypes. Again, as this is purely speculation, it is impossible to know whether this would have facilitated a reduction in resistance, but making such an effort may have paid dividends even at this late stage in the process.

## Steps number seven and eight – Consolidate gains and produce more change & Make change stick.

At this stage of the model, the beleaguered process of implementing the black beret had little momentum from which to consolidate gains and produce more change. Additionally, the reality was that acquiring and issuing the beret was a finite project with very few long-term demands, except sustaining production for the purpose of resale in the military clothing sales system. However, step seven in Kotter's paradigm does introduce the concept of organizational culture, but saves the discussion largely for step eight.

As such, taken from step eight, perhaps the most elemental component missing from the decision to implement the black beret was an apparent disregard for the complex nature of Army culture. Recall the earlier reference to step eight, which touched on the importance of human nature and culture. During the interview, SMA(R) Tilley discussed the dynamic of leadership and human relationships in managing change. Specifically, he recalled being surprised by some of the resistance encountered, because previously in his career he had always been able to win the support and influence the people around him with his personal involvement. It was suggested to

him that this was perhaps a function of the hierarchical nature of the Army (think step number five's challenges) and that in his position as the SMA, he was, in many ways, significantly removed from a large majority of the subordinate leaders who were dealing with this change. Therefore, his ability to directly influence the process with personal persuasion was mitigated and had become more challenging. He generally concurred with this observation, believing it probably had some impact. Next, he talked about the challenge leaders have in implementing change as a function of the duration of their assignments. Just as suggested by the Hague study presented earlier, SMA(R) Tilley lamented about the notional example of a leader who assumes a key leadership position and somehow, in as little as two to four years, attempts to make significant changes. He postulated that in these circumstances any leader will face tremendous difficulty because there are other people involved who will simply attempt to "wait you out", knowing that your tenure is virtually a temporary event.[46]

Unquestionably the CSA undertook the decision to implement the beret with only the best of intentions. It is possible that if his decision had been supported by a CM model like Kotter's, the transition to the new headgear would have produced less resistance and perhaps generated the Army's ability to embrace the symbolic first step towards transformation, just as the CSA originally intended.

## Case Study No. 2 – the Army Combat Uniform

In January 2003, the Army announced its intention to develop and field a new combat uniform, the Army Combat Uniform (ACU). SMA Kenneth Preston and the CSA, GEN Peter Schoomaker initiated the project believing there was a need to streamline the Army's uniforms and reduce the related maintenance and upkeep expenses for Soldiers. The Army's PEO Soldier

[46]Ibid.

at Fort Belvoir, Virginia worked closely with SMA Preston and teamed with Fort Lewis's Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) to conceptualize, develop and test a multitude of prototypes.

In contrast to the eight months from announcement to fielding for the black beret, it took 18 months from inception to initial fielding of the ACU. Although 18 months was still considered a rapid fielding, this process was seemingly more balanced and measured in its tempo as it moved towards the end-state. However, just as with the case of the black beret, there was no specific CM model used to guide their efforts. They did, however, follow the CSA's intent, which was; Consider the Army's history and traditions, insist on simplicity, and above all mandate the uniform's utility.

The primary sources of information for this case study were provided by SMA Preston and the SBCT lead point of contact, then Sergeant First Class (SFC) Jeff Myhre, now a retired Master Sergeant (MSG). They each provided written responses to a series of questions, both of which are available at Appendix D. Just as with the black beret case study, the focus here is a dispassionate and objective review of the process of managing this change initiative. Also, as with before, any errors of context, intent or quotation are mine and not intended to be misattributed to SMA Preston or others personnel associated with the introduction of the ACU.

## Step number one – Establish a sense of urgency

Cognizant of the long lead times usually associated with acquisition and procurement programs, SMA Preston focused his efforts in order to achieve a faster realization of the end product. His primary sense of urgency was driven by the belief that the current array of uniforms "was not providing soldiers with the utility [needed] to accomplish their missions."[47] MSG (R)

[47]SMA Ken Preston, interview by author, (written interview), Responses received by email on 25 January 2007, availalbe at Appendix D.

Myhre added that "the [ACU] represented an urgent change [because our] Army [is] engaged in combat operations..."[48]

By way of comparison, consider how urgency was instilled in the case of the black beret. While beret was implemented more quickly than the ACU's, the reason for urgency with the beret was entirely associated with the need to meet an arbitrary date, albeit historically significant, of 14 June. Kotter's model suggests that one of the many reasons companies fail to establish a sense of urgency is failing to illustrate the presence of a major and visible crisis. Arguably, in neither case was there a true crisis at hand, however, with regard to the ACU, the assertion was made and funding procured based on the realization that Soldiers who were serving in harms way needed something better than what was currently available in a combat uniform. With this purposeful goal in front of them, the process moved forward.

## Step number two – Build the guiding team

As with the beret, the guiding coalition for the ACU project also included members from the Army's acquisition community as well as the staff agencies responsible for uniform policy (the Army Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Personnel and Logistics). Another vital member of the guiding coalition was MSG(R) Myhre and the soldiers of the SBCT. In light of the key characteristics that Kotter suggests must be represented in the guiding team including position power, expertise, credibility and leadership, the guiding team implementing the ACU included this critical sampling of end users. The SBCT stood for Soldiers with expertise and credibility as to how the uniform would be used in practice by the larger force. Therefore, they provided invaluable, iterative input to the members of the acquisition, research and development community so that the end product would reflect not only form but function – the utility that GEN Schoomaker had mandated.

[48]MSG(R) Jeff Myhre, interview by author (written interview), Response received by email on 30 January 2007, available at Appendix D.

Clearly, the process of introducing the ACU was achieving more success compared to the beret at this stage and when measured against the Kotter CM model. However, there was one group that was under-represented in the membership of the guiding team. In SMA Preston's Leader's Book Notes, he stated that [at the start], "we took a group of NCOs and sat down with the design engineers and set about to create a better combat uniform."[49] The Army's officer corps was again under-represented, as it was with the black beret. While research to specifically link the repercussions of this oversight was not conducted, one of the significant complaints about the ACU when it debuted was that officer branch insignia was no longer displayed on the uniform. This complaint persists today, although it has subsided to some degree. One can only wonder if branch insignia would have been included, as it had been previously, if an equally representative sampling of officers been part of the guiding team. In this sense, the guiding team also contravened a portion of GEN Schoomaker's intent of keeping with the history and traditions of the Army. Nonetheless, the ACU project was, in fact, garnering more momentum and acceptance much earlier in its process, in contrast to the beret, as it moved forward to step number three.

## Step number three – Develop a vision and strategy

SMA Preston acknowledged that there was no formal vision statement prepared to help steer the team. However, he also underscored their focus on GEN Schoomaker's intent as the basic guidelines they used, stipulating that they strove "to develop the best equipment…so that our Soldiers remain second to none…By viewing the Soldier as part of an integrated system, our decision[s] ensure[ed] [that] everything he or she wears or carries works together as a...system."[50]

[49]SMA Kenneth Preston, Leader Book Notes, April 2006., accessed 27 January 2007, available at http://www.army.mil/leaders/leaders/sma/booknotes/2006April.html.

[50]SMA Ken Preston, interview by author, (written interview), Responses received by email on 25 January 2007, available at Appendix D.

Kotter's model undoubtedly suggests that any CM process that does not develop an effective vision is bound to find itself in peril at later stages. In this case, they overcame what could have become a misstep as they proceeded with a very deliberate endeavor to communicate with the field Army about the new ACUs, as evidenced in step number four.

## Step number four – Communicate the change vision

The Army's office of Public Affairs developed a comprehensive communications plan to support the ACU initiative (Available at Appendix E). At the direction of GEN Schoomaker and with the active participation and guidance of SMA Preston, the Chief of Army Public Affairs, BG Vincent Brooks, made a conscious effort to ensure that Soldiers throughout the Army were informed routinely on the status of this project. Amongst other things, they provided regular updates on the Army home page, and conducted interviews with internal (DA/DoD) and external media (ABC, NBC and CBS networks). Additionally, they published written articles, Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) and quarterly updates in digital and print venues such as the PEO Soldier website, the TRADOC website, The Army Times, Soldiers Magazine and The Army Logistician, etc. They also sought to answer questions from Soldiers and leaders in the field wherever they traveled to test or display the prototype ACU uniforms.

In these efforts, SMA Preston and his guiding team stayed closely aligned with Kotter's CM model by ensuring that they used multiple venues, repeated their message routinely, and kept their message simple and clear.

## Step number five – Empowering broad based action

Aside from acquisition related problems, SMA Preston relayed that there were many obstacles to overcome in the form of complaints from Soldiers and leaders who did not understand and questioned why the Army was developing the ACU. The SMA commented, "That is the reason why the communication plan was so important. The more we could communicate our vision to

Soldiers, the better understanding they had…"[51] Additionally, as the testing process was underway, Soldiers lodged a myriad of complaints about the initial quality of various components of the uniform, such the strength of the stitching – especially in the crotch area, the poor durability of the hook and loop attachments (Velcro), and some reports of problems with the new pattern experiencing color fading when washed.[52]

As a matter of instruction, the purposeful collection of feedback, the inclusion of suggestions for improvement from Soldiers, and the personal attention from SMA Preston in responding to the Soldiers and leaders were integral to reducing resistance and provides some evidence as to the importance designing an iterative process. Kotter specifically addresses the resistance that is likely to occur when employees feel boxed in by structures or supervisors that discourage the implementation of change. By seeking feedback from Soldiers involved with the test unit (the SBCT) as well as from others across the Army, SMA Preston had granted a very wide audience an opportunity for unique access not only to himself, but to the process of making the ACU a reality. Suddenly, Soldiers and leaders were part of the 'design team', providing input, and not just subject to its results.

## Step number six – Create short-term wins

In *Leading Change*, Kotter discuses the value of planning for short-term wins mostly from an 'internal' perspective. He talks about them providing the guiding team motivation by creating concrete or visible results, rewarding the change agents for their efforts by building their morale and how they keep bosses informed by providing evidence that the change effort is on track. Kotter also mentions one facet of short-term wins which is more 'external' in nature. It is the ability of short-term wins to build momentum for the change across the organization, turning

[51]Ibid.

[52]SMA Kenneth Preston, Leader Book Notes, April 2006., accessed 27 Janury 2007, available at http://www.army.mil/leaders/leaders/sma/booknotes/2006April.html.

neutral people into supporters and reluctant supporters in to active helpers.[53] In the case of the ACU, the vast majority of the focus was on responding to and supporting the customer – the Soldiers. By having an 'external' focus on building support and momentum for change, a certain level of excitement and anticipation was created by Soldiers. So much so that by May of 2004, when SMA Preston made his first visit to Iraq as the SMA, he found a substantial problem existed in safeguarding the uniforms from theft during the laundering process. SMA Preston said this was evidence of, "how sought after and popular the uniform had become."[54]

While having to combat thievery is an unwelcome consequence, it remains undeniable validation of the success of their efforts to communicate with the field about the progress being made with the ACU during the acquisition process and to actively "market" the prototype uniforms while the development was underway.

## Step number seven – Consolidate gains and produce more change

While the ACU project was experiencing tremendous progress in its development and eventual fielding, additional pieces of the combat uniform "system" were also developed, to include a revision of the Extreme Cold Wet Weather Clothing System (ECWWCS). The new ECWWCS introduces a black (and foliage green) fleece jacket, silk weight underwear, a wind shirt and a rain patrol jacket and pant set, amongst others. Many additional uniform pieces and revisions were also required, primarily because the new ACU represented a new camouflage pattern in the pixilated design. Kotter references a corollary in step seven as he discusses what he terms, "the problem of interdependence." He says, "…we often don't adequately appreciate a crucial fact: that changing highly interdependent settings is extremely difficult because, ultimately, you have to change nearly everything."[55] In this case, the ACU itself is a highly interdependent system and

[53]John P. Kotter, *Leading Change*, (Boston, Mass.: Harvard Business School Press, 1996) pg 123.

[54]SMA Kenneth Preston, Leader Book Notes, April 2006., available at http://www.army.mil/leaders/leaders/sma/booknotes/2006April.html, accessed 27 January 2007.

[55]John P. Kotter, *Leading Change*, (Boston, Mass.: Harvard Business School Press, 1996) pg 136.

demanded matching items to go with it. All of the formerly woodland patterned items had to be updated to accompany the new uniform.

SMA Preston and GEN Schoomaker also recognized their successes with the ACU as an opportunity to go one step further and streamline the Army's large family of dress uniforms by eliminating the Army's "Class A" uniform. The CSA took the decision in order to further reduce long-term maintenance and upkeep costs to soldiers by modifying the current Blue Army Service Uniform and designating it as the Army's standard dress uniform.

### Step number eight – Make change stick

Although SMA Preston and his team did not face the challenge of being "waited out" by those who were initially resistant to the new ACU, he nevertheless displayed a keen sensitivity to the importance of solidifying its acceptance. In April of 2006, nearly two years after the ACU was initially fielded, SMA Preston published an installment of his Leader Book Notes which were entirely dedicated to the ACU. In this document, the SMA went to great lengths to reinforce the reasons for the uniform's inception, the history of its development and testing, the current status of accompanying uniform items still in development, and he provided a picture of the way ahead with potential improvements under consideration for future generations of the ACU.[56] This document is nothing short of amazingly deft in its ability to truly "make change stick", just as Kotter suggests. Clearly, SMA Preston has adopted the ACU as a "living" project and is far from checking it off of his "to do" list.

## Case Study No. 3 – Letterkenny Army Depot: The Army Teaches Business a Lesson in Lean Six Sigma

This monograph does not delineate between the practices of *lean* and those tied to *six sigma*. In this way, the use of the term LSS in this study is somewhat imprecise. However, it will not

[56] SMA Kenneth Preston, Leader Book Notes, April 2006., available at http://www.army.mil/leaders/leaders/sma/booknotes/2006April.html, accessed 27 January 2007.

substantively detract from the readers' grasp of the concepts presented, the foundational theory presented in Kotter's CM model, or its relationship to LSS or *lean* ideas.

The Letterkenny case study will show that the depot commander did many things right. This examination details the actions he took and compares them to each step of the Kotter CM model. The abstract for this case study is included at Appendix A, but an excerpt is provided here to enable contextual understanding of the situation.

> Colonel (COL) William Guinn was assigned as depot commander in July 2002 only to find the depot was in deep financial and operational trouble...
> This case documents COL Guinn's Lean Six Sigma deployment at Letterkenny Army Depot from 2002 to 2005. Using the principles and tools of Lean, Letterkenny's commander, senior leaders, managers, and employees successfully transformed the depot from the Army's worst to its best performing depot in terms of productivity and cost efficiency. Three years after the depot's Lean journey began, the 2005 BRAC Commission not only recommended keeping Letterkenny open, but also assigned it additional programs. In the same year, Letterkenny won the public sector Shingo Prize for applying Lean to its Patriot Missile recapitalization program[57]

Previously, this paper has carefully delineated between process management tools, such as LSS, and CM as the higher order model. While it may seem that presenting a case study based on the use of LSS is a reversal of the earlier assertions that CM is the definitive position, this case study demonstrates two important concepts. First, as stated before, LSS remains an important tool with exceptional applicability for targeted, production-oriented activities. This case underscores this assertion as it describes the functions of the depot's Maintenance Directorate (MD). The case study author states the MD tasks are "similar to the production function in a manufacturing company…[with] most of the LSS events [occurring] within this directorate."[58] Second, this examination will show how COL Guinn's use of LSS was brilliantly supported by measures clearly associated with CM. Although the Letterkenny case study did not espouse the application of any particular CM model, this review follows COL Guinn's resourcefulness and

[57]Roger K. Harvey and Chester S. Labedz. "The Army Teaches Business a Lesson in Lean Six Sigma", (Letterkenny Army Depot, Department of the Army, 2006), pg. 2.
[58]Ibid, pg 5 and 6.

highlights the actions he took that clearly align with the steps of Kotter's CM model and enabled him to revitalize and resuscitate the depot's operations.

## Step number one – Establish a sense of urgency

At his very first Directorate meeting after assuming command, COL Guinn made the following announcement to his depot's leadership.

> I would be doing the Army and the American taxpayers a favor by closing this depot. I would be putting this place out of its misery…It would be a mercy killing and no one would court-martial me for doing it.[59]

After only a few days in command he had swiftly identified several major problems confronting the organization. Topping his list were operational losses in excess of 31 million dollars, work flow processes that were wasteful and disorderly, personal costs that were the highest in the defense depot system and a dilapidated infrastructure. After making clear that the depot was undeniably in crisis-mode, COL Guinn immediately displayed a keen sense of leadership. He deftly made himself part of the depot team when he closed his first meeting with the following remarks:

> I took this assignment to make Letterkenny the most cost-efficient depot in the Army; I have never retreated, I have never surrendered; I'm here to fight for the survival of Letterkenny...and here is my plan to accomplish the mission…[60]

Just as Kotter suggests in his discussions on establishing urgency and on the importance of leadership, COL Guinn placed himself squarely in the lead role as the driving force in creating change at Letterkenny Army Depot (LEAD). More importantly, he imbued his employees and subordinate leaders with a sense of urgency, clearly articulating the reality of the situation and taking the first crucial steps needed to save the organization.

[59]Ibid, pg 3.
[60]Ibid.

## Step number two – Build the guiding team

Just before assuming command at LEAD, COL Guinn received some pivitol guidance from the then Commander of the Army's Materiel Command (AMC), General Paul Kern. GEN Kern suggested to COL Guinn that he read a book entitled *Lean Thinking,* by James P. Womack. Guinn immediately embraced the concept of *lean* outlined in this book. Then, after taking command, as COL Guinn conducted his initial analysis of LEAD operations, he was simultaneously looking for those individuals within the organization that would become instrumental in the depot's change initiative. He was routinely found walking the floor and talking with employees, listening to and hearing not only their concerns, but also their suggestions on how to make the Maintenance Directorate function more efficiently. One day, Guinn came upon Steve Miller, an Industrial Engineer who was on the HMMWV (High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle) production line. After a short conversation, COL Guinn discovered that Steve Miller was highly experienced in the business of LSS and he realized that he had found a central figure to assist him in championing the changes.[61]

Although COL Guinn knew that the steps of LSS would be primary tools in the strategy for making change happen at LEAD, he also knew that the strategy had to be more inclusive of a wider set of operating and procedural issues. Next, Guinn carefully crafted his vision and strategy and astutely managed these challenges.

## Step number three – Develop a vision and strategy

Another of COL Guinn's initial inquiries uncovered a stark reality at LEAD – the depot had not been preparing the quarterly Review and Analysis (R&A) reports for some time. He directed the reinstatement of this report and during one of the first briefings to discuss the results, COL Guinn recalled thinking that it was "five hours of meaningless numbers." Therefore, in addition

[61]Ibid, pg 6, 7 and 10.

to LSS, first and foremost, he knew the depot had to develop more meaningful metrics to assess performance. Further, he and his staff developed a strategic business plan, vision and mission statements, performance objectives and a Mission Essential Task List (METL) as they laid the groundwork for implementing change.[62]

Next came the task of effectively communicating the change vision. COL Guinn did not stop with the discovery of Steve Miller as just one change champion. He worked tirelessly to invigorate all of his employees with the same enthusiasm and hopeful outlook that he held for LEAD. He knew that reaching the wider workforce was vital to overcoming employee resistance to change.

## Step number four – Communicate the change vision

COL Guinn knew the task of communicating effectively was a daunting one. As a result, he used every venue available to him. The depot's strategy and vision was carried in depot newsletters, discussed in open meetings with Directors (COL Guinn encouraged any employee to attend his Director's meetings), transmitted via Division Chiefs to the frontline employees and even printed in the local community newspapers. Unquestionably, COL Guinn and his staff attacked the task of communicating with an aggressive marketing campaign. Additionally, the commander was very careful to widely publicize the successes the depot was having – taking a page from Kotter's step number six.[63]

Another important factor considered by COL Guinn was the anticipated employee resistance to change. He knew that to be effective, he would have to address the concerns of his workers. Instead of attempting to answer the question, "what's in it for me", COL Guinn selected a principle directly from LSS practices. He asked, "…what's in it for the customer?"[64] He

[62] Ibid. pg 9-10. Also, see Appendix B, "Letterkenny Initiatives" for the LEAD vision, strategy and METL.

[63] Ibid, pg 10.

[64] Ibid, pg 14.

redirected the focus of the depot's team efforts towards the customer, causing a shift in the culture within the labor force and thereby silencing many potential critics while simultaneously motivating his personnel to focus on the customer's needs. Of course, the customer was the American Soldier and this was an obvious and important motivational asset, as nearly all employees saw themselves as patriotic supporters of the troops. With this clever tactic, COL. Guinn generated "buy-in" and gained the popular support of much of the workforce, enabling the active support for a myriad of change initiatives. Even so, there remained much work to do. Pockets of resistance still existed, as did some training deficiencies and organizational barriers to creating more change momentum. Once again, COL Guinn led the depot towards success with methods associated with Kotter's step number five.

## Step number five – Empowering broad-based action

Recall that in this step, Kotter addresses four of the biggest obstacles to creating change. They include structural (organizational) silos, troublesome supervisors, outmoded skills and antiquated personnel systems. At Letterkenny, COL Guinn tackled these problems with tenacity. Mirroring Kotter's CM model along with techniques associated with LSS practices, he developed training goals and a concept of "learning by doing". All employees were required to participate in LSS events, including involvement in processes that were outside of their usual jobs. Further, their participation in these events was tracked. This method did two important things. It enabled all employees to learn first-hand about the successes being generated by the *lean* practices and provided a measure of cross-training for the new procedures that were being adopted. The net result was that the employees became motivated and personally encouraged to continue working for positive change.[65]

[65]Roger K. Harvey and Chester S. Labedz. "The Army Teaches Business a Lesson in Lean Six Sigma", (Letterkenny Army Depot, Department of the Army, 2006), pg 20.

Another of COL Guinn's inspired projects included sending his employees on field trips to nearby businesses, a technique also mentioned in Kotter's model as well as in LSS guidelines. A partial list of those companies included K-Mart and Target distribution centers, Harley Davidson, and Mack/Volvo Truck. The results of these field trips is captured in a comment one of the depot employees (the depot paint shop supervisor) made after returning from one of these trips. He said, "I saw for the first time that for a paint shop to be productive it didn't have to be dirty with piles of stuff all over the place…Now if you look at my shop it's so clean it doesn't look like anything is happening."[66] This system of involving employees in field trips not only dissolved barriers, but continued the process of achieving buy-in. Yet, there remained some tremendous hurdles to overcome. A number of middle managers were still resisting.

As suggested by Kotter's model, some managers were simply afraid of being viewed as less-than-productive, or worse, entirely outmoded. Their concerns were easy to understand, especially given that their productivity was now being measured against LSS designed performance metrics and because LSS enabled the front-line workers to participate actively in identifying problems, creating solutions and then implementing them. To overcome this challenge, COL Guinn offered additional training specifically to impart to his managers a greater understanding of LSS and its procedures, as well as to enable them to develop new roles for themselves as LSS leaders. He took great strides to personally and consistently communicate with these managers and continued to require their participation in LSS events around the depot. The combination of these tactics enabled his managers to overcome their fears, gain an understanding of LSS and accept the new tasks required of them[67].

As COL Guinn continued to lead his depot team towards a secure and profitable future, he sustained progress with measures reflected in steps six, seven and eight.

[66]Ibid, pg 21.
[67] Ibid, pg 21 and 22.

## Steps number six thru eight – Create short term wins; Consolidate gains and produce more change & Make change stick.

With the pressure of the impending 2005 BRAC commission, which would consider the closure of LEAD, COL Guinn knew that he had to make substantial and visible progress rather quickly. In considering the first project, the commander and his deputy reviewed the options. His deputy suggested implementing LSS slowly with a small project in order to minimize the negative impact should the projects stumble.[68] Instead, COL Guinn decided to attack with one of the largest programs the depot managed – the PATRIOT missile system. By choosing the PATRIOT project, the commander modeled a willingness to take calculated risks and highlighted to his team that he was serious about saving LEAD from BRAC. As adoption of the LSS processes progressed, the depot achieved tremendous results, including a reduction of 1,000 labor hours per launcher and 20% reduction in floor space requirements. LEAD was immediately able to translate these savings to the customers by issuing "customer checks", or credits for future work at the depot, while at the same time increasing future customer demands. Just as Kotter suggests in step six, COL Guinn took the opportunity to visibly recognize these achievements by presenting "ceremonial checks the size of a surf-board" to the customers in public ceremonies. Photographs from these events were publicized and proudly displayed to the employees to show them how their work was paying off.[69] Further, employees began to personally reap the benefits of their hard work when the depot's nearly extinct bonus system was rejuvenated. When LEAD started down the road to change in 2002, employees received a yearly bonus of only $131. By 2005, every civilian employee was earning the maximum bonus of $1000, yearly.[70]

As 2005 arrived, LEAD had been saved from BRAC and the entire workforce was actively seeking ways to continue improving efficiency and cost savings. The depot team had witnessed

[68] Ibid, pg 22.
[69] Ibid, pg 22, 27 and 31.
[70] Ibid, pg. 24.

the possibilities and was generating its own momentum for additional changes to existing and newly added maintenance programs. Further, because employees realized they had created a secure and dynamic future at LEAD, the changes implemented were firmly anchored in the depot's business practices, its culture, and within its personnel.

The LEAD case study is a powerful example of how CM modeling, especially when combined with supporting tools such as LSS, can produce amazing results even when faced with an overwhelming and complicated mission.

These case studies have considered a range of change initiatives that vary in complexity and scope. Overall, this study has attempted to provide a balanced perspective and emphasize the value of Change Management modeling. The next section will synthesize the observations and provide some analysis in an attempt to reiterate the crucial points.

# CHAPTER FOUR
# OBSERVATIONS & ANALYSIS/IMPLICATIONS

As depicted in these cases, the Army has experienced mixed results in leading change. Although none of the case studies presented used the Kotter model to guide their efforts, when directly compared to it, the results suggest that using a construct like Kotter's to frame the thinking and consideration of CM can produce positive results.

Adapting a tabular construct originally produced in a paper by Major Richard Jeffress, also on the topic of leading change, the following table summarizes the application of Kotter's model in each of the three case studies.[71]

| Kotter's CM Process Model Steps | Case Study No 1 The Black Beret | Case Study No 2 The ACU | Case Study No 3 Letterkenny Depot |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Establish Urgency | +/- | + | + |
| 2. Build the guiding team | - | +/- | + |
| 3. Develop vision & strategy | - | +/- | + |
| 4. Communicate the vision | - | + | + |
| 5. Empowering action | n/a | + | + |
| 6. Create short term wins | - | +/- | + |
| 7. Consolidate gains | - | + | + |
| 8. Make change stick | +/- | + | + |

At a minimum, there are some essential lessons that can be learned from a review of these cases. Amongst the most important principles are:

- Resistance to change is *normal*. You ***must*** expect it.
- Leadership is vital. So are junior leaders and managers.
- Lay the groundwork for change with vision and communicate it. You owe an explanation to your troops.
- Culture counts. Yes, it is hard to measure and target – so what? Get on with doing your best.
- Your guiding coalition or team should be representative of your organization.
- Be inclusive. Design an iterative process and look for feedback early.
- A word about sequence, patience and timing your efforts
- Administrative systems and organizational structures – if you can't beat 'em, join 'em.

[71]Richard Jeffress, "Leading Change: A Model for Transformation Initiatives in Today's U.S. Army?", (Fort Leavenworth, KS., Command and General Staff College, June 2003). pg 73.

### Resistance to change is normal. You must expect it.

Human beings like predictability. We like the status quo, especially if we are comfortable and enjoy the routine in which we find ourselves. Think of the deliberation involved in making small changes in your own life. A hypothetical example may include buying a piece of furniture or new bath towels (environmental fixtures) because you badly need the function they perform. The purchase involves some analysis to ensure the new items disrupt your current environment as little as possible. You want them to 'fit in', match what you already have, and 'go with' the rest of your décor. In essence, you are concerned about disrupting and creating change in an environment with which you have already grown comfortable. It does not matter whether you desperately need the new item(s). Not just any bath towel or barcalounger will do. Now consider a similar change in your personal life that stipulates you change your morning routine (a process). Instead of eating breakfast after you've dressed for work, consider the impact it would have on you if you were told to eat before you dress, but after your shower because a thorough analysis said it was more time efficient, saving you 10 to 15 minutes each day. You'd probably still resist this change, even if it really were more efficient, because you are used to the way you do things now and you like it.

Resistance to change is normal. This is also true for Soldiers who have learned to function and identify themselves inside a given context. It does not matter if the proposed change increases efficiency or enables an important function. The first question that they will ask is *why*. This is where the next two principles apply.

### Leadership is vital. So are junior leaders and managers.

Of the volumes of material available on dealing with change, nearly all of them discuss the significance of leadership in heading up change efforts. For the Army, leadership is more than an empty platitude meant to inspire self-development. For the professional Soldier, leadership is an extraordinarily valuable trait and military leaders are cultivated, trained, educated and given numerous opportunities to emerge every day. One thing that is clear from the case studies

presented is that no single senior leader, not even the commander of an organization, can effect change by him or herself. In his book, *The 360° Leader*, John Maxwell discusses this notion saying that "…leading an organization has become so complex and multifaceted, the only way to make progress is to develop a team of leaders."[72] Maxwell goes on to discuss the importance of how leaders in the middle make better leaders at the top.

> Leaders in the middle of an organization are closer to the people in the trenches…they know more about what's going on. They understand the people who are doing the work and the issues they face…[and they] have greater influence at those lower levels than the top leaders.[73]

Fundamentally, leading change is a task involving the influence and persuasion of people. Leaders not only have the ability, but the responsibility to perform this task. Leaders must influence, persuade, convince and explain the situation to their subordinates in order to win their enthusiastic support. This is where the leader's vision sets the tone and starts the process of motivating and inspiring change.

**Lay the groundwork for change with vision and communicate it.**

Rarely has anyone been motivated with statements like, "do this because I told you to…". Reflect on the enormous resistance witnessed by GEN Shinkseki and SMA Tilley in the aftermath of the decision to adopt the black beret. GEN Shinseki undeniably had the best of intentions. He sought to invoke a spirit of enthusiasm and esprit for the Army's long legacy of excellence, as well as to steel the force for the challenges of the future and the forthcoming transformation initiatives. However, he perhaps also missed the opportunity to precede his decision with vision instead of making the decision and later providing the vision. Recall also that Kotter emphasizes the importance of strictly following the sequence in his CM model. In Kotter's model, developing and communicating the vision are steps three and four. Sequencing of the steps is an important point that will be returned to later, but for now, just know that sequence does matter

[72]John C. Maxwell, *The 360 Leader*, (Nashville, Tenn. Thomas Nelson, Inc., 2005). pg. 268.
[73]Ibid, pg 281.

and vision should not normally follow decision. Put another way, sometimes it can be *how* you say it, rather than *what* you say.

> How someone frames an issue influences how others see it and focuses their attention on particular aspects of it; framing is the essence of targeting a communication to a specific audience.[74]

Even though relatively brief, this analysis clearly shows how critically important communications with stakeholders is to any change effort. In case studies two and three, there was a coherent and concerted effort placed on communicating with their target audiences. Part of any communication process must involve listening to the input and feedback of the members of your organization. Although you may not be able to adjust your plan to suit all your Soldiers, a leader's personal involvement in responding to your troops will make them feel they had a vote in the process and that you cared enough to solicit their input. This simple iteration sets the process of reducing resistance and winning acceptance into motion.

### Culture counts. Yes, it is hard to measure and target. So what? Get on with doing your best.

Any long-standing organization develops a tangible and substantive culture that is unique unto itself. An historic organization, like the Army, is laden with symbolism and traditions that are deeply rooted in history, tested in battle, and have survived generations of experimentation, socialization and evolution with a staunch deliberateness that has preserved not only itself, but the nation which it defends. This sort of organization is a formidable foe to any change efforts and should only be underestimated at the peril of the change agent.

Leaders must recognize that culture is a critical factor when creating change. The Army culture, when viewed holistically as a system, has many interdependencies. As with any system, injecting change into that system creates a ripple effect, just as a pebble thrown into a still pool of water. Leading change requires the careful consideration of the far-reaching impact of change

[74]Harvard Business School Press, *Getting People on Board*, "Framing for Leadership", by Melissa Raffoni, (Boston Mass:, Harvard Business School Press 2005). pg 127.

initiatives on the cultural and organizational interdependencies that will be affected. Anticipating the breadth of impact, being cognizant of the resistance that culture can present and laying the ground work to reduce some of the anticipated resistance to change or transformation is essential in order for the subordinate leader(s) and employees to overcome those hurdles.

**Your guiding coalition or team should be representative of your organization.**

One tremendous technique for reducing resistance to change suggests that broad participation from personnel that represent as many segments of your organization as possible will influence them to take ownership and become part of the change effort. David Stauffer in his article, "How to Win the Buy in", quotes a Best Buy employee who was part of a change implementation team as saying, "…We had team members four levels below the top leaders telling [them] how their behaviors were harming the change process….to their credit, [the senior managers] listened and responded."[75]

Admittedly, assigning members to a guiding coalition or change implementation team alone will not convince them to actively support the initiative. However, membership will bring them closer to the analysis of the problem and provide them a deeper understanding of why you have initiated change. Participation also provides one of the best opportunities for employees to become proponents for the process rather than opponents, and will enable them to speak with confidence while they answer and ask questions of their peers and subordinates across all levels of your organization.

**Be inclusive. Design and iterative process and look for feedback early.**

Just as your guiding coalition should be representative of your organization, designing an iterative change process will enable an even greater number of employees to provide input and suggestions for change. Their ability to provide this input creates personal involvement, which in turn makes them stakeholders and active participants in the process. More importantly, it makes

[75]Ibid, "How to Win the Buy in", pg. 73.

them feel as though their opinion is valued, further bonding them to the change initiative. Even the most junior employees can offer a unique perspective on change. As suggested earlier, the people in the trenches are often in a better position to spot undetected areas that require change in order to facilitate and support other aspects of the larger project. Further, requesting and listening to feedback from "the rank and file" will ultimately build relationships and further strengthen the organization's ability to adapt and evolve with the process of change.

### A word about sequence, patience, and timing your efforts.

Let us return to the importance of following the sequence of steps as portrayed by Kotter's model, as was mentioned earlier. Although Kotter strongly recommends that it is critical to follow the steps of his model in sequence, he also admits that it is possible to be involved in multiple steps at the same time. After researching the case studies presented and reading widely on the topic of CM, this study suggests that while sequence is indeed important, there is flexibility depending on the complexity *and* scope of the changes being contemplated. For instance, with a particularly complex change, it is viable to consider forming a guiding coalition as the first step in order to study the requirements for change. This could be followed by the development of vision and strategy, and subsequently by establishing urgency and communicating the vision as created by your guiding team. In this logical scenario, Kotter's model would proceed from step three, to step two, back to step one and then on to step four, and so on. Additionally, for less complex change initiatives, it may be possible to first create the vision, which would assist in establishing urgency for your burgeoning guiding coalition. From there your team could further study the problem, and revise the vision and strategy before proceeding to communicating the vision and going on with the remainder of Kotter's model.

In any case, across the spectrum of change initiatives it is important to proceed with each step of Kotter's model. Contrary to Kotter, it is also believed that there is room to maneuver with regard to sequence and an ability to mold his model to best fit the initiative.

In order to achieve the best possible results, leaders must be situationally attuned to the pulse of their organization. This is where timing and patience become significant factors in launching any change effort. The Army as a whole is a large system, connected to numerous external agencies, that are also systems themselves. Every subordinate command and unit exists within the Army's larger system and we must account for the environmental factors, both external and internal, which impact the footing on which change begins in the Army. Leaders must assess their strategic and cultural environment before rushing to implement significant transformation. Professor of Organizational Behavior at Loyola College, Dr. Anthony Mento, writing in the Journal of Change Management, outlines a CM process that is consolidated from several models. In his amalgamated model his step three is "evaluating the climate for change". He cites an example of a change project where two indices were used to evaluate the readiness of a company to change. The first measure evaluates the current organizational stress that is present in the company, especially in view of competition for scarce and dwindling resources necessary to support the change. The second measure is to review the historical readiness to perform new projects. Finally, Mento addresses the need to ensure change goals align with a company's long range strategic plan.[76] There may be quite a few potential environmental factors to consider when taking the organizational temperature and assessing the proper time to initiate change, but if properly considered they can prevent your change initiative from being buried before it has had a chance to begin.

### Admin systems and organizational structures – if you can't beat 'em, join 'em.

Like any governmental agency, the Army is a bureaucracy. It is also very hierarchical. Recall SMA Tilley's realization that because of the high-ranking position he held as the SMA, he had not anticipated the divide between he and the Army's subordinate units and leaders. This then presented an unanticipated obstacle to his ability to influence and persuade his subordinates that

[76]Anthony J. Mento, "A Change Management Process: Grounded in Both Theory and Practice", (Journal of Change Management, Henry Stewart Publications, 2002.) pg. 50.

previously had been a routine facet of his career. On the other hand, at LEAD, COL Guinn knew he had to find a way to visibly translate the depot's improvements into tangible results for his customers. Instead of waiting for the annual budget process to reap these benefits of his team's efforts, he created "customer checks", or credits, for customers to apply against future work programmed at the depot. In each case, these leaders ran into administrative systems and organizational structures that they could not change, yet LEAD was able to successfully find a way to work within the existing systems and still produce the desired results.

As much as it is possible to prepare for and anticipate resistance, leaders must be prepared to overcome obstacles to change as they find them, and return later to effect change by revising inefficient or ineffective systems and structures as part of a long term solution.

# CONCLUSION

The three cases reviewed are certainly not an exhaustive sample of all change efforts undertaken by the Army. However, they do offer an opportunity to systematically examine change management as a process unto itself.

If we expect leaders to be proficient in understanding the science of leading change, we must provide them the tools of the trade. Returning to the earlier mentioned interview with LTG Christianson, when referencing the current status of our system of Professional Military Education, the General went on to suggest that all current PME neglects [an understanding of] the process that supports change and that our PME should be embedded with a view towards continual process improvement. "It [whatever you're working on] can always be made better", he said. Our PME must adapt to include mandatory training on the process of leading and managing change, to include an in-depth focus on the science of the process and how to avoid the pitfalls typically encountered in leading change. In 2002, then LTC Michael G. Gould suggested a similar requirement as he analyzed the Army's transformation efforts measured against the theories surrounding organizational change.

> Perhaps the greatest lesson in the Army's transformation effort will be identifying the lack of education of its officers and mid level managers with respect to how to change and transform organizations.[77]

The elective offered at CGSC, Leadership: A Force for Change, is an excellent program of instruction and should be made mandatory for students at ILE. Further, this course should be migrated to other PME venues, to include the Basic Officer Leader and Captain's Career Courses, as well as to the USASMA, at a minimum. Teaching these concepts early in a leader's career will enable them to support the strategic change initiatives which are undertaken by our Army's senior leaders while serving at the tactical and operational levels. Additionally, this education should be

[77]Michael G. Gould, "Strategic Leadership and Organizational Change: Challenges in Army Transformation", (Carlisle Barracks, PA., U.S. Army War College, 2002). pg. 15.

reinforced, the program of instruction tailored at each PME level. Our senior leaders should receive instruction appropriately scoped during their attendance at the School of Command Prep (SCP), at the Senior Service Colleges and subsequently the Brigadier General's Training Course (BGTC), which will give them an opportunity to revisit the topic of CM as they hone their focus and prepare themselves to provide continued strategic leadership into the Army's future. This 'tiered' system of teaching CM will provide the Army the long-term and systemic effect of a nested education for its leaders. In turn, this will posture the entire institution for greater success when dealing with the inevitability of leading and managing change as the Army continues to transform to meet the demands of an ever-changing future.

John Kotter's model is just one CM model which provides the basis for understanding the science of CM. There are many other potential candidates to consider. Although Kotter's model is outlined in FM 6-22, it should be more deliberately permeated throughout the Army and our educational institutions should focus on developing leaders with formal programs of instruction on CM. As a result, those who have been taught to understand the science of CM as a unique discipline will be significantly better situated to effect and lead change into the Army's future.

There will always be internal and external factors that create a force of resistance to change. Budget constraints, the strain of today's operational tempo, and the speed at which Soldiers and leaders must produce results, as well as the administrative and hierarchical structure problems, are amongst a few. These will not be resolved in the near-term, even when the Army's on-going massive transformation efforts are complete. Understanding CM will, however, enable leaders at all levels to prepare themselves, prepare their units, and create viable solutions to lead change in the interim.

The Army is led by some of the brightest minds our nation has to offer. These men and women are extraordinary thinkers and tremendously reflective leaders who readily question the status quo, seeking to ensure the institution is best prepared to execute our nation's missions in an uncertain and unknowable future. Understanding the science and methodology of leading change

is critical to the success of our Army. Taking the time to systemically consider the reality of the enduring presence of institutional change in the Army does indicate the magnitude and the importance of this task. We must take proactive steps to address the process of educating leaders on the science and methodology of change in order to keep us "Army Strong".

# APPENDIX A.
# Abstract from Letterkenny Army Depot Case Study Report

*Letterkenny Army Depot: The Army Teaches Business a Lesson in Lean Six Sigma* is a case study of Letterkenny Army Depot, one of five Army maintenance depots. Letterkenny recapitalizes missiles, HMMWV's, generators, and other equipment for the United States Army. Recapitalizing equipment means completely disassembling the system, cleaning and/or replacing every component, subcomponent and part, and reassembling and testing the equipment.

Col. William Guinn was assigned as depot commander in July 2002 only to find the depot was in deep financial and operational trouble. Letterkenny had …

- experienced an operating loss of $31 million on revenues of $120 million
- work flows that were dysfunctional and inefficient
- the highest hourly wage rates among all the depots
- an infrastructure that was badly in need of repair

Additionally, the depot faced possible closing by the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission in 2005.

This case documents Col. Guinn's Lean Six Sigma deployment at Letterkenny Army Depot from 2002 to 2005. Using the principles and tools of Lean, Letterkenny's commander, senior leaders, managers, and employees successfully transformed the depot from the Army's worst to its best performing depot in terms of productivity and cost efficiency. Three years after the depot's Lean journey began, the 2005 BRAC Commission not only recommended keeping Letterkenny open, but also assigned it additional programs. In the same year, Letterkenny won the public sector Shingo Prize for applying Lean to its Patriot Missile recapitalization program.

The authors use a framework developed by Michael George in his book *Lean Six Sigma for Service* to present the results of their research. In addition to being a research case (i.e., a descriptive case), the case raises issues on deploying Lean Six Sigma – issues that can be addressed in business and military educational settings. *Letterkenny Army Depot: The Army Teaches Business a Lesson in Lean Six Sigma* is case about Lean Six Sigma, leading change, and business transformation.

**CONTACT INFORMATION**


Dr. Roger K. Harvey
Phone: 970.963.1444
Email: rharvey_2@yahoo.com
Website: www.valueassociates.org

Chet Labedz
Phone: 401.524.7711
Email: chetlabedz@aol.com

# APPENDIX B.
# Letterkenny Initiatives and METL

**EXHIBIT II: Letterkenny Initiatives**

### MISSION

Sustain the operating forces by providing quality Air Defense and Tactical Missile Systems, Chemical and Biological Detection Systems, and associated equipment to Department of Defense customers and Foreign Allies.

### VISION

World-class provider of logistical support capabilities for defense weapon systems and associated system/Soldier support equipment.

### STRATEGIC QUALITY OBJECTIVES

The following Quality Objectives have been developed to provide the fundamental framework for ongoing business growth, success, and development and implementation of all initiatives. The Mission Essential Task List (METL) methodology is used to cascade objectives down through the organization.

### SUPPORT ARMY TRANSFORMATION

Our support to Army Transformation is imperative. Relevance, readiness, and responsiveness are critical to the success of the Army as a whole. We will focus future growth initiatives on the sole and partnered support we can provide to existing and new/emerging Army Weapon Systems, Soldier Support Equipment and we will seek to support other Joint services that can benefit from our abilities. We will pursue process technology to recapitalize the depot. Additionally, with our employees being the greatest asset, we will expand workforce knowledge base and abilities through education, developmental job assignments, and technical skill growth.

### SUSTAIN AND IMPROVE CURRENT DEPOT OPERATIONS

Satisfying our customers by meeting or exceeding our mission quality, cost, and schedule requirements are the foundation for completing our designated core and non-core workload. We are committed and press forward in our journey on continually improving the depot through the application of ISO 9000 quality principles. Our aim throughout the depot is to continually improve operations by reducing and eliminating non-value-added activities and functions, ensure relevant/pertinent tasks, and streamline processes to enhance effectiveness, efficiency and ensure affordability.

### SPECIFIC COMMANDER GOALS

Specific Quality Objectives (Commander's Goals) are actions we must take to enhance our business growth and ensure satisfaction of current and future customers.

Source: *Letterkenny Army Depot Shingo Prize Achievement Report*, 2005.

**EXHIBIT III: Mission Essential Task List (METL)**

## LEAD Strategic Business Plan Quality Objectives Matrix

| SUPPORT ARMY TRANSFORMATION | SUSTAIN & IMPROVE DEPOT OPERATIONS | SPECIFIC COMMANDER OBJECTIVES | STRATEGIC QUALITY OBJECTIVES / DIRECTORATES & SPECIAL STAFFS / SUPPORTING DEPOT GOALS | DOM | DRM | DOIM | DPA | DOC | DRSK | DS&T | CPAC | DPW | COMMAND GROUP |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| ● | | | Develop Partnership Initiatives | | NA | | | | NA | | | | NA |
| ● | | | Recapitalize Depot | | | | | | | | NA | | NA |
| ● | | | Train Workforce | | | | | | | | | | |
| | ● | | Quality | | | | | | | | | | NA |
| | ● | | Cost | | | | | | | | | | NA |
| | ● | | Delivery | | NA | | | | NA | | | | NA |
| | | ● | Increase Workload to 2.0M DLH | | | NA | | | NA | | | | |
| | | ● | Support Successful Production Start-up of All New Workload | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | ● | Clean up Depot | | | | | | | | | | NA |
| | | ● | 100% Lean Participation by 30 July 05 | | | | | | | | | | |

GREEN BLOCK INDICATES ACCEPTABLE PERFORMANCE TO OBJECTIVE
YELLOW BLOCK INDICATES OBJECTIVE REQUIRES IMPROVEMENT
RED BLOCK INDICATES UNACCEPTABLE PERFORMANCE TO OBJECTIVE

Key:
DOM = Directorate of Maintenance
DRM = Directorate of Resource Management
DOIM = Directorate of Information Management
DPA = Directorate of Product Assurance
DOC = Directorate of Contracting
DRSK = Directorate of Risk Management
DS&T = Directorate of Supply and Transportation
CPAC = Civilian Personnel Advisory Center
DPW = Directorate of Public Works

Source: *Letterkenny Army Depot Shingo Prize Achievement Report*, 2005.

# APPENDIX C.
# Interview notes with SMA(R) Jack L. Tilley
# 30 November 2006

**Background**: When SMA Tilley assumed the duties of the SMA, the decision to procure the black beret for the army had already been taken by the then, CSA – General Eric Shinseki. This issue had been an on-going one for several years and had been carried forward thru several CSAs. Gen. Shinseki ultimately held a sort of round table with other 3 and 4 star generals in the Army and asked them to review and consider the proposition with their CSMs. None on this panel dissented and the decision was then made to switch to the black beret for all Soldiers in the Army. There was no Change Management (CM) model identified or used.

**Establishing Urgency** – Not specifically addressed. However, SMA Tilley did indicate that he felt it important to execute the decision as soon as possible, based on the CSAs decision/guidance.

**Create a guiding coalition** - SMA Tilley gathered representative leaders from a multitude of logistics agencies – (DLA, AMC, Acquisition, etc…) to begin reviewing the requirements to achieve procurement. He specifically initiated inquiries into how the berets would be funded and procured – noting that there was only one US company identified, as SMA Tilley recalled, that could make the berets for the Army. The team was decidedly focused on the acquisition process and less so with regard to guiding the switch as a change management issue throughout the larger Army. SMA Tilley also noted that the initiative was taken on as an NCO-centric event, stating that for the most part "officers were cut out of the process".

**Develop a Vision or Strategy:** There was no vision statement or change management strategy developed/published for use by either the CSAs office or the logisticians and acquisitions personnel assembled by the SMA, or for consumption by the larger army. However, they did publish a history of the beret in magazines such as Soldiers Magazine, NCO journal, the Army Times and in the AUSA magazine. At the conclusion of the interview, SMA Tilley remarked that in view of a CM model such as Kotter's, perhaps this step, and the communications step (see below) were not executed as well or as vigorously as they could have been to facilitate the reduction of resistance.

**Communicate the vision:** See above. Additionally, SMA Tilley traveled to a wide variety of NCO academies, to include the USASMA to educate NCOs about the coming change to ensure they had an understanding as to why the beret was being implemented and to ensure that the procedural / organizational standards were understood (proper wear and appearance) etc. There was not a specific communications strategy, as mentioned above.

A feedback loop was not designed into the implementation of the beret, although SMA Tilley was constantly seeking out questions and answering as many as possible whenever and wherever he traveled. Because the decision to implement the beret had already been made, the necessity for a feedback loop or iterative process may have been minimalized.

**Empowering broad based action (Getting rid of Obstacles)**: There was a variety of issues and obstacles SMA Tilley had to overcome. First, there was resistance from groups such as the Ranger Regiment and the Army retiree population. SMA Tilley specifically commented on how upset the reitrees were about the implementation. He noted that he believes this is because any changes to the Army, whether it be in uniforms or such things as the Army slogan going from "Be all that you can be" to "An Army of One" affect retirees acutely because these changes further remove them from their time in service and from what was "their Army". SMA Tilley also remarked that the Army needs to devise a way to communicate with the retiree population more effectively – not only because of the influence that retirees have over a range of issues, but because they are a vital party of our larger Army community and can be instrumental parts of the army team into the future by continuing to serve in other ways.

Secondly, the acquisition process was identified as tremendously cumbersome and restrictive. The widely publicized problem with some berets manufactured in China was mentioned but was not the focus of the interview or this monograph – This problem, however, was a function of the acquisition process itself.

Thirdly, the requirement was identified to account for the proper wear of the new head gear by publishing a change to AR 670-1 to reflect the authorization and procedures with regard to the beret.

Next, SMA Tilley discussed the dynamic of leadership and human relationships in managing change. Specifically, he recalled that he was surprised by some of the resistance because previously in his career, he had always been able to win the support and influence the people around him with his personal involvement. I suggested to SMA Tilley that this was perhaps a function of the organizational hierarchy of the Army and that in his position as the SMA, he was now, in many ways, significantly removed from a large majority of the subordinate leaders who were dealing with this change. Therefore his ability to influence it directly and personally was mitigated and became more challenging. He generally concurred with this observation, believing it probably had some impact. Next, he discussed the challenge leaders have in implementing change that is a function of the duration of their assignments. He gave a fictional example of a leader who assumes a position and in as little as two to four years, attempts to make significant changes and is presented with tremendous difficulty because there are other people involved who will simply attempt to "wait you out", knowing that your tenure is virtually a temporary event.

The Kotter model also suggests that occasionally one needs to eliminate personnel or systems that inhibit the change process. SMA Tilley did recount that there were a few, but not many, other senior NCOs smattered throughout the Army that were putting forward significant resistance to the implementation of the beret. In one case, a company 1SG had informed his unit that they would simply not make the switch. After this problem surfaced to SMA Tilley, understandably, the 1SG was reassigned and removed from his leadership position. SMA Tilley commented that it was entirely inappropriate for leaders to behave in that manner - in direct contravention to the Army's stated policy. He also noted that Soldiers, while generally very good at accepting change as a part of their lives, must also learn to adapt to it, even when they oppose.

**Achieving short-term wins:** As the acquisition process proceeded, the flash, a component of the beret, was being developed. This milestone afforded the opportunity

for several potential designs to be prepared, all of which were reviewed by the Army's Institute of Heraldry to ensure historical compliance with the Army's lineage. From an administrative aspect, this was also a restriction, albeit an important and justified restriction. Once the final potential designs for the flash were available, SMA Tilley took the prototypes to the USASMA and other NCO academies to gather feedback. In the end, there were two final designs and the CSA and SMA Tilley determined that the Army would implement the one in use today.

**Consolidate the gains and produce more change.** Not specifically addressed
**Anchoring the change in the culture**. Not specifically addressed, except as expressed under step number five above.

# APPENDIX D.
# Written Interview with SMA Preston and MSG(R) Myhre

**Case Study No. 3 – Questions to and written response from SMA Kenneth Preston**

1) As you considered the change from the BDU to ACU & Class A to the new Service Dress, did you follow or review a model for change management to plan required activities and actions? If so, which model did you use? (for example, the Elizabeth Kubler-Ross model, Commitment to change model, John Kotter's transformation process model or the cultural indicator tree model)

No, the decision was made by GEN Schoomaker after consulting with me, the G-4, G-1, PEO Soldier, commanders and command sergeants major, and Soldiers. We did not use a model for change management – just the idea that there was a need to streamline our uniforms to cut down on costs for Soldiers and to simplify our uniform inventory. Tradition, simplicity, and utility were all considered when we made this decision.

2) Did you identify any need for urgency in implementing the change? Why or why not?

Historically any change of equipment in the Army took a long time. In most cases, by the time you do the testing and analysis, years have passed in the process. This uniform was fielded in 18 months from concept/design approval to fielding to the first unit, the 48th Inf Bde, Georgia National Guard.

Yes, there was a need for urgency because we are an Army at war supporting a Nation at war and the current inventory of uniforms was not providing our Soldiers with the utility to accomplish their missions.

3) Was there a team identified to sponsor and guide the change effort? If so, who was involved in this team (Names are not necessary, but may be helpful for additional interviews. Please do, however, include duty positions of team members, to the best of your recollection)

Yes, there was a team that contributed to the effort. At that time, SFC Jeff Myhre, now a retired Master Sergeant who now works for Program Executive Office – Soldier, SGM Troy Welch from the G-4, SGM Katrina Easley from G-1, and all the program developers in PEO Soldier and Natick Labs. SFC Myhre came out of the Stryker Brigade as a platoon sergeant. He served as the liaison between the Stryker Bde who tested the original concept in training and then wore the DCU version of the new uniform in combat. During this entire time, SFC Myhre provided feedback to the designers at Natick Labs where on the spot modifications were made to the uniforms. The result is a uniform fielded in a very short period with great acceptance from the Soldiers who wear it everyday in combat.

4) If you identified and gathered a team, did you publish a vision statement or mission statement for the team to use or one to be published to the wider Army specifically regarding this change? If so, may I request a copy of the vision statement? If you did not have a vision statement to support this change effort, skip to question 7.

There was no vision statement formally published but here are the guidelines we follow when looking at making uniform changes: to develop the best equipment and field it as quickly as possible so that our Soldiers remain second to none in missions that span the full spectrum of military operations. As recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have vividly demonstrated, getting the right equipment to our military men and women is absolutely critical. By viewing the Soldier as part of an integrated system, our decision ensures that the Soldier and everything he or she wears or carries works together as an integrated system. The result is an overall systematic design that benefits Soldiers by enhancing their ability to accomplish individual and collective tasks, improving quality of life, building confidence, and saving lives.

5) How did you communicate the change vision to the wider army? (For instance, published the vision on AKO; sent "all user" emails, placed adds in the Army Times, Gave public speeches, etc.) Please list as many forums as you can recall in which the vision was published.

The vision was communicated using the internet (Army Home Page), Soldiers Media Center (TV and radio interviews by senior leaders, Army News Service, Soldiers Magazine and other internal publications), external media (Army Times, ABC News, NBC, CBS).

6) How often were you able to communicate your change vision? Was the communication planned and deliberate? (For instance, 12 consecutive monthly adds in the Army times, quarterly updates on the process posted on AKO, conducted monthly briefings specifically for the purpose of discussing the change, etc?)

Office, Chief of Public Affairs developed the communication plan with approval from GEN Schoomaker, BG Brooks (chief of public affairs), and myself. Attached is public affairs guidance for the ACU, along with my Leaders Book Notes to the field regarding the ACU.

7) Was the change process iterative? For example, prior to implementation, did you gather input from the field and address questions or concerns raised by soldiers in the field? If not, skip to question 9.

Yes. Please see the Leaders Book Notes regarding the ACU. It goes into detail on how we gathered input from the field.

8) Can you recall any specific instances when your change vision was altered based on receiving this feedback/input?

Yes. We received a lot of feedback from Soldiers and Leaders on what worked and what didn't work with our ACU designs. For instance, because Soldiers wear body armor in Iraq and Afghanistan, they needed a holder for their pens and highlighters that they could get to easily. So our uniform developers put a pen holder on the left sleeve of the ACU. Also, a young Soldier complained about the buttons on the early versions of the ACU and how because the body armor was rubbing on the buttons creating a pressure point on the breast bone, he said "it feels like the button is rubbing a hole into my breastbone". So developers took that and decided a zipper and Velcro would be more comfortable for Soldiers. Hence, the ACU is a uniform designed for the rigors of combat.

9) Did you encounter any obstacles to your change effort? If so, what were the obstacles? (For instance were the obstacles related to the acquisition process, organizational or hierarchical problems, army "cultural" resistance, administrative restrictions/bureaucracy, or individual persons or groups who resisted, etc. While I am interested in understanding all obstacles encountered, describing problems related solely to the acquisition process may be abbreviated) If you did not encounter obstacles, skip to question 11.

There were several obstacles that we overcame on the road to development with the ACU. Change can be hard, especially making major uniform changes while fighting The Long War. There were complaints from Soldiers and Leaders across the Army who did not understand why we were making this change. That is the reason why the communication plan was so important. The more we could communicate our vision to Soldiers, the better understanding they had of the process for change. Also, there were some complaints about the quality of the uniforms – this is detailed in the Leaders Book Notes.

10) Please describe how you overcame the obstacles.

Communicating our vision clearly and succinctly helped to garner support for the uniform change and to get everyone on board with GEN Schoomaker's vision.

11) Where there milestones achieved that enabled you to publicize the status of the project and the successes achieved along the way? (For example, did you begin to sense your effort was gaining positive momentum at any point and then used the achievement of those milestones to continue gaining momentum for the change? [Perhaps when the prototype ACUs and Service Dress uniforms were produced?] If so, please describe how you did this.

Yes, as we achieved milestones along the way, we produced TV/Radio/Print products to support those milestones and ensured the news got out to the force through Command Information channels. It was not as important to get the word out to the external media because our goal was to keep our Soldiers and their families informed.

12) As you proceeded thru the change, did you identify any opportunities to consolidate on your success by doing such things as, changing or improving systems that supported your change, advancing or promoting people who had worked successfully in support of the change, identifying the need or possibility for more change efforts (or projects) and then starting on them?

Yes, the streamlining of the Army Combat Uniforms led us to look at our family of dress uniforms. This resulted in the decision made by GEN Schoomaker to go with the Blue Army Service Uniform, to help save Soldiers money by streamlining our dress uniforms.

13) Once the change was implemented, did you undertake any initiatives to anchor or reinforce the change? (For instance: Did you capture lessons learned on your change process and any successes or difficulties encountered; Did you find there were personnel or systems that had to be eliminated [personnel reassigned or fired admin systems eliminated or revamped]; Were there any organizational training initiatives identified to assist team members to better manage a wide array of change management initiatives; Were there any organizational structures that required changing?) If so, please describe how your efforts to anchor and reinforce the change.

Yes, part of any decision making process includes doing After Action Reviews. We discussed what we did right and how to sustain those decisions; what we did not do right and how to fix those decisions; and brainstormed on how we can improve on the process in the future.

**Appendix D (cont)**
**Questions to and written response from MSG(R) Jeff Myhre**

1) As you considered the change from the BDU to ACU & Class A to the new Service Dress, did you follow or review a model for change management to plan required activities and actions? If so, which model did you use? (for example, the Elizabeth Kubler-Ross model, Commitment to change model, John Kotter's transformation process model or the cultural indicator tree model)

No formal model was used during this change. Prototyping, testing, evaluation and basic decision making happened at the user level. Both of these changes stemmed from a belief within the ARMY that a more usable combat Uniform and a singular Dress Uniform were needed for the force. This led to prototyping, testing and review by soldiers and Senior Army Leadership, to arrive at a material solution. The acquisition life cycle model was utilized to actually make the change, in-order to meet budgetary and manufacturing decisions at a large "whole Army level' once the new uniforms were approved.

2) Did you identify any need for urgency in implementing the change? Why or why not?

The Combat Uniform represented an urgent change; the urgency came from our Army being engaged in combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. We used this urgency to streamline and speed-up manufacturing to meet the numbers required by deploying forces. The dress uniform had no real urgency tied to it, which allowed a more deliberate acquisition strategy.

3) Was there a team identified to sponsor and guide the change effort? If so, who was involved in this team (Names are not necessary, but may be helpful for additional interviews. Please do, however, include duty positions of team members, to the best of your recollection)

The team tasked identified to guide this change was Program Executive Office Soldier (PEO-Soldier) Fort Belvoir Virginia and the Natick Soldier Systems Center (NSC) Natick Massachusetts. PEO BG Moran, PM-SEQ COL Norwood, PM-CIE LTC Anderson, APM-CIE Barry Hauck, PM-CIE NCO Jeff Myhre, Engineer-Natick Scott Gaumont. Dress Uniform- PEO BG Brown, PM-SEQ COL McGuiness, PM-CIE LTC Lemondes, APM-CIE Dave Geringer and multiple engineers.

4) If you identified and gathered a team, did you publish a vision statement or mission statement for the team to use or one to be published to the wider Army specifically regarding this change? If so, may I request a copy of the vision statement? If you did not have a vision statement to support this change effort, skip to question 7.

5) How did you communicate the change vision to the wider army? (For instance, published the vision on AKO; sent "all user" emails, placed adds in the Army Times, Gave public speeches, etc.) Please list as many forums as you can recall in which the vision was published.

We solicited feedback via AKO, PEO Soldier Website, ARMY Times, and face to face with Leadership and soldiers at each level at multiple locations.

6) How often were you able to communicate your change vision? Was the communication planned and deliberate? (For instance, 12 consecutive monthly adds in the Army times, quarterly updates on the process posted on AKO, conducted monthly briefings specifically for the purpose of discussing the change, etc?)

This was a fairly deliberate process for each uniform…..at least monthly soliciting some kind of feedback.

7) Was the change process iterative? For example, prior to implementation, did you gather input from the field and address questions or concerns raised by soldiers in the field? If not, skip to question 9.

The combat uniform was completely driven by soldier needs and comments. The force provided information sometimes on an almost daily basis, on what they needed to meet their requirement in a more versatile, functional and comfortable fighting uniform. We solicited feedback for the dress uniform as well, but this was more of a need to make a more presentable/ better looking dress uniform.

8) Can you recall any specific instances when your change vision was altered based on receiving this feedback/input?

On several occasions the combat uniform was changed based on feedback that we received both from leadership and from the field. In some instances this guidance gave the uniform a more military appearance and in some cases made it more combat user friendly. The same holds true for the dress uniform.

9) Did you encounter any obstacles to your change effort? If so, what were the obstacles? (For instance were the obstacles related to the acquisition process, organizational or hierarchical problems, army “cultural” resistance, administrative restrictions/bureaucracy, or individual persons or groups who resisted, etc. While I am interested in understanding all obstacles encountered, describing problems related solely to the acquisition process may be abbreviated) If you did not encounter obstacles, skip to question 11.

No real obstacles impacted our decisions relative to the ACU or the Dress Uniform. Once we had a final design it came down to “dollars and who gets it” and when.

10) Please describe how you overcame the obstacles.

11) Where there milestones achieved that enabled you to publicize the status of the project and the successes achieved along the way? (For example, did you begin to sense your effort was gaining positive momentum at any point and then used the

achievement of those milestones to continue gaining momentum for the change? [Perhaps when the prototype ACUs and Service Dress uniforms were produced?] If so, please describe how you did this.

Once we had successful trials with the prototype ACUs and it looked like it was going to become real, we used this "good news" to saturate the media……ARMY Times, commercials etc. We also conducted a leadership visit strategy to allow Commanders and CSMs a chance to see the uniform and begin to inform their soldiers.

12) As you proceeded thru the change, did you identify any opportunities to consolidate on your success by doing such things as, changing or improving systems that supported your change, advancing or promoting people who had worked successfully in support of the change, identifying the need or possibility for more change efforts (or projects) and then starting on them?

One significant change that occurred from the ACU, was a supply chain management initative, this allowed us to more accurately predict and get on contract the right uniforms in the right sizes for future fielding's. This has proved invaluable.

13) Once the change was implemented, did you undertake any initiatives to anchor or reinforce the change? (For instance: Did you capture lessons learned on your change process and any successes or difficulties encountered; Did you find there were personnel or systems that had to be eliminated [personnel reassigned or fired admin systems eliminated or revamped]; Were there any organizational training initiatives identified to assist team members to better manage a wide array of change management initiatives; Were there any organizational structures that required changing?) If so, please describe how your efforts to anchor and reinforce the change.

We have continued to use supply chain management in our other programs, and as we continue to evolve these two uniforms, continue to look for things that can help us with other programs. The supply change management change has been carefully documented and has allowed our logisticians to look at sized items and better ways to forecast future deliveries

# APPENDIX E.
# Army Combat Uniform Public Affairs Communications Plan

**SUBJECT:** Army Combat Uniform

**REFERENCES:**

**1. PURPOSE:** To prepare Army public affairs units/organizations for public engagement concerning the debut and subsequent questions on the new Army Combat Uniform (ACU).

**2. BACKGROUND:** The Army Combat Uniform (ACU) was presented to Senior Army leadership in December 2003 for potential Army fielding. On 5 April 2004, after review by the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) and the Sergeant Major of the Army (SMA) the Program Manager for Clothing and Individual Equipment (PM-CIE) was directed to field the uniform to deploying units by April 2005 and complete the fielding to the entire Army by December 2007. The ACU was presented and discussed with each of the Army Major Command (MACOM) Sergeant's Major in April 2004 and was addressed at the Sergeant Major of the Army's conference in May 2004. Although the uniform design is essentially complete, it still is undergoing minor modifications and decisions as to where to place specialty and unit badges and insignia. The ACU is being produced in a new Universal Camouflage (UC) "pixilated" scheme similar to the Marine Corps pattern. The ACU is tailorable to the individual mission, is centered on functionality and ergonomics and will enhance Soldiers' performance and safety. During its design, development and evaluation, the ACWU had continuous input from Soldiers.

**3. PUBLIC AFFAIRS POSTURE:** The Public Affairs posture for this program is proactive.

**4. PUBLIC STATEMENT:** The new Army Combat Uniform is the culmination of many months of research and development and is the uniform of choice by the overwhelming majority of the Army's leaders and Soldiers. The uniform was developed with direct and continuous input by the Army's Soldiers and has been embraced by the Army's rank and file. Because of its universal camouflage pattern and enhanced versatility, comfort and ergonomic qualities, the ACU will increase our Soldiers ability to train, adapt and fight in the ever-changing environments wherever future wars will be fought. The uniform will be fielded quickly, replace multiple versions of the current woodland pattern battle dress uniform and will be easy to maintain, thereby decreasing the out-of-pocket costs to our Soldiers. The ACU is the Army's continuing effort to equip the Army's Future Force now and to provide *America's Most Deployed Combat System*, our Soldiers, the best, state-of-the-art equipment possible, ensuring their safety and capabilities.

**5. THEMES AND MESSAGES:** The following talking points may be used when talking to the public or media. Unit/Installation PAOs should maximize the use of the Army's strategic themes and messages when discussing any issue. Army strategic communications guidance can be found on Army Knowledge On-line in PA Communities.

**THEME:**

Our Army at War: Relevant and Ready

**MESSAGES:**

- The Army improves survivability, safety, mobility, and sustainability for Soldiers to dominate in all operational environments, by providing state-of-the-art, operationally effective individual clothing and equipment.

- Soldiers are our centerpiece and deserve the best we can offer. The ACU will provide the functionality, ergonomics and durability enabling our Soldiers to be more effective in combat and to increase their survivability as they carry out their mission.

- All Soldiers, regardless of unit or function, will be issued the new uniform. There will be no discrimination between the active and reserve forces. The Army is a team and all Soldiers will be treated equally.

- Army senior leaders, and more importantly the individual combat unit – The Soldier, have already overwhelmingly endorsed the ACU. Soldiers throughout the Army say that the ACU is not change for change sake but is a welcome and appreciated change.

- The ACU will decrease the "out of pocket" cost burden on our younger Soldiers by replacing the 3 types of the current Battle Dress Uniform (BDU) with a one-weight, wash-and-wear uniform with improved functionality and ergonomics.

- The resourcing and acquisition of the ACU is a huge success. It is manufactured with direct and continuous involvement of Soldiers input throughout the design and evaluation process.

- The ACU is Future Force capability and technology to enhance Current Force TODAY. ACU will improve Soldier's performance with improved functionality and is tailorable to individual.

- The ACU, including component materials, will be manufactured in the United States using the same industrial base that produces the current BDU, thereby ensuring the highest quality control and assisting the American work force.

- The ACU will be fielded immediately, without delay, to the people who need it the most, our combat Soldier.

**6. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS:** The following questions and answers are provided for use in response to query. Queries beyond the scope of the statement in paragraph 4 and the Q's and A's will be referred to the following: MAJ Gary Tallman, OCPA/MRD, (703) 697-4314; Debi Dawson, PEO Soldier, (703) 704-2802; etc.

**Q.1 Will the clothing allowance be increased since the cost of the uniform will go up?**
HQDA G4 is working with PM Soldier Equipment, G1 and Army Budget Office to if there will be an increase to the CRA FY06 for the ACU (Must determine if the wear-life will change).

**Q.2 How many uniforms will be issued at basic training? And will the standard issue at military schools still be four?**

The Basis of Issue for the ACU will be the same as the BDU. Four (4) ACUs will be issued to new Soldiers in Initial Entry Training. The basis of issue for military schools will remain four.

**Q.3 What will be the lifetime of the uniform?**

ACU is made with the same nylon/cotton rip-stop fabric as the current Enhanced Hot Weather BDU (EHWBDU). The current EHWBDU has an estimated wear life of six months.

**Q.4 How could starch damage the uniform?**

The ACU will not require starching. See question 3 above. Starching uniforms makes the uniform material more brittle and subsequently reduces the wear life. The wrinkle-free treatment will allow Soldiers to wear the ACU without incurring costs of commercial laundering or pressing.

**Q.5 Will other Army issued items change to match the pattern of the uniform?**

Yes, some items (patrol cap, tan boots & T-shirts) will be introduced concurrently w/ the ACU. Other Army woodland and desert pattern items will be evaluated to determine an appropriate single color pattern. However Specific timelines have yet to be determined.

**Q.6 What will be the wear-out date for the battle dress uniform?**

The Army will introduce the ACU in FY06. Wear-out date for BDU is TBD. Production ramp up of the ACU will cause production of the BDU to end in early FY 06. Residual stocks of BDUs will be sold or issued until exhausted. The wear out date will be established based on when stocks are exhausted. The wear out date will provide an adequate amount of time for Soldiers to procure the ACU.

**Q.7 Why is the Army asking for funding for uniforms instead of more money for items that would give Soldiers protection like armor?**

The ACU was designed specifically by Soldiers to meet the demands of the current operational environment while wearing Interceptor Body Armor. The current BDU was designed 25 years ago, before the Army routinely wore ballistic body armor. The Small Arms Protective Inserts require the Interceptor Body Armor to be worn closed. The ACU compliments the Interceptor Body Armor by improving access to pockets, and eliminating comfort issues associated with the Small Arms Protective Inserts pressing the current BDU shirt buttons into the chest of the Soldier.

**Q.8 Why was the digitized print chosen over the more traditional camouflage?**

**There are a number of potentially effective technologies to provide effective camouflage. The ACU leverages a digitized print developed by the USMC. The Army modified the USMC pattern and used alternate colors to provide an effective camouflage in multi environments**.

**Q.9 What is the Army Warrior Combat Uniform?**
The Army's Universal pattern uniform that will replace the Temperature/Hot Weather Battle Dress Uniforms and the Desert Camouflage Uniform.

**Q.10 What does it consist of?**
The ACU consists of trousers, a coat and a patrol cap.

**Q.11 How much does it cost?**
The cost of the ACU coat is approx $44.00 and the approximate cost of the ACU trousers is $44.00.

**Q.12 What does it look like?**
**Visit our website @ https://peosoldier.army.mil for photos of ACU.**

**Q.13 When will it be fielded?**
The ACU is scheduled for fielding as an organizational item in Apr 05 and will be in the clothing bag in FY06.

**Q.14 Who will pay for it?**
Enlisted Soldiers (active Army (Clothing bag), USAR and ARNG) will receive an initial issue of 4 each ACU (Army expense); prior active Army enlisted Soldiers will receive CRA (Army expense); prior enlisted USAR and ARNG will issue the ACU as required (Army expense); officer will buy (at their expense) the ACU from the Army Military Clothing Sales Stores; and deploying enlisted Soldiers and officers will be issued ACUs at the Army's expense.

**Q.15 Can you wear the beret with it?**
Yes

**Q.16 Is it compatible with other equipment?**
The ACU works well with existing equipment with specifically designed to integrate with Body Armor.

**Q.17 Will the reserve component be getting it?**
Yes, The ACU will be fielded to the Army – Active, Reserve and National Guard.

**Q.18 Why did you borrow the pattern from the Marines?**
The Marines had already invested in the research and development of a digital pattern. The Army leveraged this investment and adapted it to the needs of the Army.

**Q.19 Do they (the Marines) have any heartburn with that?**
Use of the pattern was coordinated with the Marines Corps.

**Q.20 Why a new uniform now?**
The BDU was introduced over 25 years ago and the Soldiers needed a uniform designed to meet the needs of current combat operations. Soldier were involved in every aspect of the design of this uniform.

**Q.21 I've talked to Soldiers who don't like it. Please respond.**
Change is always hard. Some my take longer to adjust to the ACU.

**Q.23** Who is the manufacturer and where are they located?
The same manufacturers that are producing the current BDU/DCU are expected to produce the ACU.

**Q.24 Explain the new camouflage pattern. It looks like it will be visible in the woodland environment.**
The new pattern is designed to work in the three primary combat environments, Woodland, Desert and Urban. Though not optimized for any particular environment, it is effective in all three.

**Q.25 Is there a web site I can go to for more information, e.g. pictures, artwork, etc and Soldier feedback RE: ACU?**
**Visit our website @ https://peosoldier.army.mil for photos of ACU**

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